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PROCEDURAL LABYRINTHS AND THE INJUSTICE OF
DEATH: A CRITIQUE OF DEATH PENALTY HABEAS
CORPUS (PART ONE)*
Alan W. Clarke**
I. INTRODUCTION
Habeas corpus was once a broad writ of liberty: it served to
give meaning to expanding notions of due process, it forced
state judicial systems to obey constitutional commands, and it
made effective modern conceptions of fundamental fairness.
Although a simple implement of humble origin, U.S. habeas
corpus became inextricably interwoven with the substantive
rights it enforced. Without a practical remedy, cutting across
state boundaries and affording uniform access, the substantive
rights themselves lose meaning. A right without remedy is a
right without meaning. Thus, habeas corpus became an impor-
tant part of the substantive rights that it enforced.
Once an important human rights remedy, habeas corpus has
been virtually obliterated by the Rehnquist Court's assault on
the Warren Court's expansion of individual liberty. The Warren
Court used a broad habeas remedy to enforce broadened indi-
vidual rights, and Congress tacitly agreed by enacting habeas
corpus statutes that were congenial to this effort. The succeed-
ing Burger Court modestly trimmed these rights without doing
violence to the habeas corpus remedy. The Rehnquist Court
* The following is Part One of a two-part article that critiques death penalty
habeas corpus. Part One includes discussions on the ineffective assistance of counsel
and the federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. Part Two of this article which
will be published in a forthcoming issue of the University of Richmond Law Review,
discusses issues related to retroactivity in habeas corpus proceedings and procedural
default. Part Two concludes with a discussion of the "deregulation of death."
** Member of the Virginia and Michigan bars; BA, 1972, College of William and
Mary; J.D., 1975, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; LL.M., 1994, Queen's University
(Kingston, Ontario, Canada). The author wishes to thank Richard Bonnie, Professor of
Law, University of Virginia, and Phillip Goldman and Allan Manson, Professors of
Law, Queen's University, for their many helpful comments and suggestions. I also
thank them for their patience.
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that followed largely avoided direct confrontation with substan-
tive Warren Court precedents. Instead, it eviscerated the proce-
dural remedy of habeas corpus by reversing earlier expansive
habeas precedents, and by circumventing Congressional will in
its statutory habeas corpus regime. It accomplished this by
erecting a variety of procedural barriers that, taken collectively,
have severely eroded the Great Writ, and, if carried further,
will judicially repeal Congress' entire habeas regime. The most
important of the many procedural barriers to habeas relief
erected by the Rehnquist Court are set out briefly here and are
examined at length in the body of this paper.
1. The strict enforcement of state procedural default rules in
federal habeas corpus prevents federal habeas oversight of is-
sues not preserved under state pleading and practice rules. The
procedural default doctrine is mechanically and sweepingly
applied regardless of the merit or importance of the claim or of
the harshness of the result. The doctrine's narrow exceptions
provide only ephemeral hope, rarely affording relief.
2. Stringent and grudging rules governing ineffective assis-
tance of counsel claims reward states for appointing less quali-
fled lawyers even in serious criminal matters-including capital
murder. This ensures that the best constitutional claims and
the best arguments will be missed at trial and, therefore, will
be barred by the doctrine of procedural default.
3. Strict enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine requires all
claims to be presented in the state court before they can be
heard in federal habeas corpus. This forces unnecessary dupli-
cation of effort, obstructs merits consideration of claims, and
allows state courts to find or create yet more procedural de-
faults.
4. The Supreme Court's judicial creation of a strict retroac-
tivity rule bars application of any "new rule" to a case that was
final (and therefore only addressable by habeas corpus) at the
time of the announcement of the new rule. This stringent
nonretroactivity rule has been interpreted in such a way that it
prevents consideration on the merits of most legal issues on
habeas corpus.
Thus, if procedural default fails to prevent access to federal
habeas corpus, then the nonretroactivity rules will prevent this
1328
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access. The only thing that is certain is that the vast majority
of habeas corpus petitions will fail, not on the merits, but be-
cause of procedural barriers. Grudging rules for the evaluation
of the effective assistance of counsel close the noose, guarantee-ing that few, if any, substantive claims will be redressed. The
doctrine of exhaustion has become the wild card, literally ex-
hausting non-death row prisoners, while eliminating many
death row prisoner claims.
These procedural barriers derive from four factors that drive
the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. Three of these four factors,
summarized below, will receive detailed treatment in the sec-
tions that follow.1
The first characteristic of the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence
is its inconsistency; its sole consistency appears in its disposi-
tion to favor the government and rule against the individual.
The inconsistency and result orientation of Rehnquist Court
habeas jurisprudence can be distinctly seen in its retroactivity
cases. This new judicially created body of law is riddled with
internal contradictions and is applied only one way-against
criminal defendants. Governmental petitioners may freely con-
tinue to invoke favorable new rules on habeas corpus. Further-
more, stringent application of the nonretroactivity doctrine fails
to further legitimate state interests; it insures only that state
criminal convictions, regardless of the merits or justice of the
claims, will not be reversed in federal habeas corpus proceed-
1. The fourth factor, not discussed in this article, stems from a distorted view of
the history of habeas corpus that sees the Warren Court's habeas decisions as based
upon little or no direct precedent and therefore subject to little respect under the
doctrine of stare decisis. This history is informed by the analysis of Paul Bator, who
viewed habeas corpus as limited to narrowly defined jurisdictional issues until a
slight stretching of the jurisdiction concepts occurred in the late nineteenth century.
Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963). The counterpoint to Bator's habeas history has been the
analysis of Justice Brennan, which has received support from Gary Peller. See Gary
Peller, In Defense of Federal Habeas Corpus Relegation, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
579 (1982). Under this competing analysis habeas corpus has remained remarkably
constant since Bushel's Case was tried in London in 1670. See 84 Eng. Rep. 1123
(1670). Although a historical treatment of habeas corpus would require an explication
of these different perspectives, for purposes of his article it is important to under-
stand that this debate has often been bitter and lively. See James S. Liebman, Apoc-
alypse Next Time: The Anachronistic Attack on Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 1997, 2041-55 (1992) (discussion entitled "Two Theses and Two
Tests of the Historical Scope of Habeas Corpus Review in the United States").
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ings. The rule serves primarily to frustrate habeas petitioners,
including death row inmates. It is supposed to reward state
reliance on law in existence at the time that the state considers
a criminal case. But the rule has been so rigorously construed
that it rewards state courts for crabbed and unfaithful applica-
tion of Supreme Court precedents. Under this rule, a state
court can adopt the narrowest possible interpretation of consti-
tutional law, confident that a federal habeas court cannot re-
verse the decision lest it create new law on habeas corpus. Only
outright illogical defiance of Supreme Court precedent remains
within the purview of the federal habeas court.
Political ideology is the second factor driving the Rehnquist
Court's jurisprudence. This Court embraces a legal process that
is profoundly motivated by politics. The Rehnquist Court's polit-
ically conservative ideology locks it into decisions that eschew
empirical evidence and value finality and efficiency over justice.
The Rehnquist Court's political agenda is apparent throughout
its jurisprudence in the adoption of mechanical formulations
that are empirically unsupported. This can be seen in the pro-
cedural default area where the Court's reasons for the rule-the
finality of state criminal judgments and the concomitant effi-
ciency that is supposed to follow-fails to obtain in actual prac-
tice. As will be argued below, the evisceration of habeas corpus
is motivated by an institutional view of the federal courts that
exaggerates the state criminal courts' interest in finality over
the citizen's expectations that the court system operate impar-
tially and fairly in accordance with constitutional norms. There
are convincing institutional reasons for retaining federal court
oversight of state criminal proceedings. One does not have to
maintain that the state judiciaries are inferior to appreciate
that federal constitutional rules will not be evenly enforced by a
balkanized state judiciary; only the federal judiciary, acting as
a backstop in the more important cases, can ensure uniform
treatment of constitutional norms.
The third factor driving this jurisprudence manifests itself in
the Court's clear frustration with the slow pace of executions in
this country. The Court seeks to streamline the legal process,
preparing the way for increased executions regardless of the
increased risk of executing persons who are unjustly on death
row. Revelations of innocent persons on death row, and other
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injustices in the process (including cases such as that of Walter
McMillan in Alabama who was sent to death row on the basis
of fraudulent evidence ponied up by the police)' fail to shake
the Rehnquist Court's confidence. It remains a court profoundly
wedded to the notion that the system supplies too much justice;
that the judicial system inefficiently reviews too long and too
hard the cases of persons who are, in any event, guilty. This is
a stridently utilitarian view that stands willing to execute a
few who are innocent, and others who have unjustly received
the death penalty, in order to ensure that all who are truly
guilty and morally culpable are punished. Such a position seri-
ously undervalues the injustice of executing the innocent and
those who otherwise lack the requisite degree of culpability. It
plays on the fact that the numbers of persons whose death sen-
tences were unjustly imposed is unverifiable. This allows the
lack of hard evidence to stand as proof that unjust executions
are not much of a problem. It casts the burden of proving sys-
temic injustice on those who seek to argue the point, while
stripping from them the one effective tool-habeas corpus-with
which to construct the argument.
This article demonstrates that procedural barriers have gut-
ted the Great Writ, and that the reasons given by the
Rehnquist Court for these barriers are flawed. It focuses pri-
marily on death penalty cases and the argument for reform of
habeas corpus in the capital punishment arena. It holds that
death is qualitatively different from any other punishment.
Thus, even if the Rehnquist Court's restrictions have arguable
merit in the non-death penalty arena, they should have no
application where life itself is at stake. Society has chosen to
use the ultimate sanction in some cases. If that judgment is to
prevail, the judicial system should ensure that sufficient safe-
guards are in place to assure that only those few that truly
meet the criteria can be executed. It will be shown that, as
presently administered, the death penalty is arbitrarily and
capriciously imposed. As a direct result of the Rehnquist
Court's procedural barriers, the federal habeas corpus system
fails to remedy these injustices.
2. Innocence and Execution, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1993, at A22.
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Part II develops the ineffective assistance of counsel issue.
Concentration on death penalty habeas corpus jurisprudence
permits a narrow focus in this burgeoning and unwieldy area of
the law. The history of the right to counsel under the Due
Process Clause, and later the Sixth Amendment, is traced, and
the early conceptions of the effective assistance of counsel are
adumbrated. Then, the present state of the law and the unduly
restrictive notions of the effective assistance of counsel that
have led to unjust executions are critiqued. Finally, proposals
for reform are made. Because many different types of issues
appear in the ineffective assistance of counsel area of habeas
law, this issue serves as a valuable backdrop for discussion of
several remaining issues.
Part III turns to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in
federal habeas corpus. This doctrine plays an important role in
the historical debate through the misinterpretation of Ex parte
Royall.? The issue remains important, particularly in death
penalty habeas corpus, because of the way the doctrine can
force the loss of claims.
Part IV, which, along with parts V and VI, will be published
in a forthcoming issue of the University of Richmond Law Re-
view, deals with the new (1989) judicially created doctrine of
nonretroactivity. This doctrine precludes the utilization of new
rules of constitutional law in cases that were final at the time
of pronouncement of the new rule. Particular attention is given
to the inconsistency of precedent in this area, and the doctrine's
potential to end habeas corpus.
Part V is divided into three sections. The first develops the
doctrine of procedural default, showing how the Supreme Court
has used the bar of procedural default in capital cases. The
second section criticizes the injustice perpetrated by strict appli-
cation of procedural default rules. The third provides a compar-
ative empirical analysis of the procedural default rule in capital
cases in Virginia and Kentucky. This demonstrates that the
purported reasons for federal deference to state procedural
default rules cannot be supported on empirical grounds and
further, are erroneous.
3. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
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The concluding part VI finds that the present system of jus-
tice, as applied in death penalty cases, is unjust. Procrustean
procedural rules have shackled habeas corpus. Loss of this
important remedy restricts substantive human rights. These
substantive rights are essential to the fair administration of the
death penalty. The study concludes by examining and critiquing
several reform proposals. It recommends that habeas corpus
return, at least in death penalty cases, approximately to the
position that it held in Fay v. Noia4 and Townsend v. Sain,5
before the narrow procedural hurdles were instituted by the
Supreme Court. It also supports the American Bar Association
proposals for reform which suggest ways to streamline the sys-
tem while eliminating the unnecessary barriers erected by the
Rehnquist Court.
II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: THE DEATH
PENALTY PERSPECTIVE
A. Introduction
Ineffective representation in capital cases remains a persis-
tent and systemic problem.6 It is in the death penalty context
that the shortcomings of the present system come most poi-
gnantly into focus when someone who is arguably innocent is
ineptly defended and then sentenced to death. The specter of an
innocent at the gallows can haunt the judicial system and viv-
idly capture the public's short-lived attention. In the context of
capital litigation, I will consider the constitutional right to
counsel, the changing notions of the requirement that an ac-
cused have the effective assistance of counsel, the case for re-
form, and the reforms necessary for a more just system.
Early state cases, applying state law, generally refused to
upset a verdict, even in capital cases, where the claim centered
4. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
5. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
6. See infra part M.G and accompanying notes; Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary
System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 59, 73 (1986) ("[W]hile we do not know the incidence of trial
attorney incompetence, impressionistic information indicates it may be a serious sys-
temic problem.").
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on the defense lawyer's lack of competence. The Supreme
Court's nascent right-to-counsel cases8 suggested a right to
effective assistance of counsel, and the lower federal courts9
undertook the burden of defining the standards by which
counsel's actions were governed. Ultimately, in 1984, the Su-
preme Court announced the current governing standard in a
landmark decision, Strickland v. Washington. ° This decision
has generated much criticism" and some support."2 An under-
standing of these historical developments is necessary to an
7. See infra part II.C.
8. See infra part II.B.
9. The federal court system operated independently of, and without much effect
on, the states' criminal justice systems for most of U.S. history. Two factors brought
the federal system into preeminence: (1) the incorporation of the first eight amend-
ments of the U.S. Constitution into the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 18,
which made these guarantees of liberty applicable to the states; and (2) the expan-
sion of the writ of habeas corpus to address constitutional error, see supra note 1.
Thus, (ignoring many possible intervening steps) a capital case typically takes nine
discrete steps which divide into three stages: stage one: (1) trial, (2) state appellate
process, and (3) discretionary petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court; stage two:
(4) state postconviction process (usually state habeas corpus), (5) state appellate pro-
cess, and (6) second discretionary petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court; stage
three: (7) federal habeas corpus at the U.S. District Court, (8) appeal to the U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals, and finally, (9) a discretionary petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court. To this are added numerous other steps such as "successors", Rule
60(b) motions, motions to rehear, Rule 59(e) motions, and the like, all of which are
common, but beyond the scope of this paper, and are mentioned solely to give some
sense of the complexity of this area of the law. Ineffective assistance of counsel
claims are generally not resolvable solely by reference to the trial record, because
many of counsel's actions and decisions will not appear in the record.
10. 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
11. See, e.g., Vivian Berger, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyer-
ing in Capital Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. Soc. CHANGE (1990-91); Goodpaster, supra
note 6; Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth
Amendment, 78 IowA L. REV. 433 (1993); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to the Effective Assistance of
Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986).
12. Joseph Grano, Response, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 97 (1986). Pro-
fessor Grano's Response was the product of his participation in a colloquium printed
in the New York University Review of Law and Social Change. Colloquium, Effective
Assistance of Counsel For The Indigent Criminal Defendant: Has The Promise Been
Fulfilled? 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. SOC. CHANGE 1 (1986). Professor Grano wrote in re-
sponse to Professor Goodpaster's article. See Goodpaster, supra note 6. A review of
the literature after Strickland reveals many articles critical of Strickland, but very
few, like Professor Grano's Response, have been supportive. Nonetheless, the rule in
Strickland appears to be thoroughly entrenched in U.S. jurisprudence. See, e.g., Bur-
ger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, reh'g denied
478 U.S. 1036 (1986); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
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understanding of the complexity and injustice of the present
system.
B. The Development of the Constitutional Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of Counsel for
his defence."" Given the peculiar complexities of death penalty
jurisprudence,'4 and the difficulties inherent in defending one-
self from any serious criminal charge, access to capable counsel
can be the most critical right of all. Access to competent coun-
sel can mean the difference between life and death. As the
Supreme Court put it in 1986, "[w]ithout counsel the right to a
fair trial itself would be of little consequence,... for it is
through counsel that the accused secures his other rights."5
Yet until 1932,16 an indigent defendant facing the death penal-
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution
were proposed to the legislatures of the states by the first Congress in 1789, and
were ratified on December 15, 1791. The First Congress also provided for a federal
court system by the Judiciary Act of 1789, which, among other things, provided for
the writ of habeas corpus. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, sec. 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82
(1789).
14. The reasons for this complexity are discussed infra part II.H. That capital
proceedings are exceedingly complex is beyond cavil, and has been well documented.
U.S. Circuit Judge Godbold (now Director of the Federal Judicial Center) has written:
"Taking a habeas death case is not something most lawyers want to do. In the first
place, ifs hard. It is the most complex area of the law I deal with." Abner J. Mikva
and John C. Godbold, "You Don't Have To Be a Bleeding Heart," Representing Death
Row: A Dialogue Between Judge Abner J. Mikva and Judge John C. Godbold, HUM.
RIGHTS, Winter 1987 at 22, 24. While Judge Godbold was referring to capital cases at
the habeas corpus collateral-review level, his comments seem equally applicable to
both the trial and direct appeal since the substantive law is the same. Gary
Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299, 303 (1983). Bruce Green states the following:
[Clapital cases are far more complex than noncapital criminal cases, so
that the level of skill required to provide a competent defense in a death
penalty case is higher. And at the sentencing stage, when the quality of
lawyering does make a difference, the difference is more than a matter of
degree. It is a difference between a sentence of imprisonment and a
sentence of death.
Green, supra note 11, at 434-35.
15. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citations omitted); see also,
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) ("Without counsel, the right to a
trial itself would be 'of little avail'.").
16. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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ty had little access to an attorney, and no constitutional right
to one under federal law at state expense. In 1938, Johnson v.
Zerbst7 expanded the right to counsel to federal crimes involv-
ing incarceration. Only in 1963 did the right to court-appointed
counsel expand to all felonies, 8 and not until 1972 was the
right to counsel extended to misdemeanors involving incarcera-
tion. 9
The adequacy of counsel's performance was only peripherally
involved in the first right-to-counsel case, Powell v. Alabama."
Seven black youths were charged with rape in the rural south
at the height of the Jim Crow era. The trial judge appointed
the entire county bar to represent the defendants,. with the re-
sult that no attorney had any responsibility to prepare the case.
The trial court formally appointed counsel for the defendants
only minutes before trial. The accuseds' situation was dire:
The defendants, young, ignorant, illiterate, surrounded by
hostile sentiment, haled back and forth under guard of
soldiers, charged with an atrocious crime regarded with
especial horror in the community where they were to be
tried, were thus put in peril of their lives within a few
moments after counsel for the first time charged with any
degree of responsibility began to represent them. 1
It is hard to imagine circumstances more patently unfair. The
majority had little difficulty in finding the functional equivalent
of no counsel at all, and a corresponding need for counsel. The
functional lack of counsel resulted in a violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:
17. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
18. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution (which prohibits the denial of "life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law" by the states) was enacted in 1867, it was not until the
twentieth century that the Supreme Court began to make the specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, reh'g denied 392 U.S. 947 (1968) (providing for a
concise history of the incorporation of the first eight amendments to the constitution
into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). This effectively required
the several states to abide by the more important proscriptions of the Bill of Rights.
19. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
20. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
21. Id. at 57-58.
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The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little
avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has
small and sometimes no skill in the science of law... He
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires
the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceed-
ings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know
how to establish his innocence.22
The Court went on to hypothesize the situation of a "deaf and
dumb, illiterate and feeble minded" capital defendant who could
not employ counsel with the "whole power of the state arrayed
against him" and concluded that this would clearly be a "gross
violation of the guarantee of due process of law."23
The right to counsel, which now seems so basic to the fair
disposition of any serious criminal case, began modestly as a
response to what (had it been carried out) would have been a
gross human rights violation. Few people today have any diffi-
culty seeing the injustice that Powell corrected. Yet, the Attor-
ney General of Alabama argued strenuously in Powell: (1) that
these young black men had had the services of counsel; (2) that
due process had been complied with; and (3) that, "it is impera-
tive that this Court under our system of government see that
the States be not restricted in their method of administering
justice."' Furthermore, Justice Butler, joined by Justice
McReynolds in dissent, asserted that "[t]he record wholly fails
to reveal that petitioners have been deprived of any right guar-
anteed by the Federal Constitution, and I am of opinion that
the judgment should be affirmed."25 Although Powell did not
posit an inflexible rule requiring counsel, even for all capital
cases, it soon came to be read as requiring such.26 The Su-
22. Id. at 68-69.
23. Id. at 72-73 (citations omitted).
24. Id. at 47-48.
25. Id at 77 (Butler, J., dissenting).
26. See, e.g., Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948):
On the other hand, this Court repeatedly has held that failure to appoint
counsel to assist a defendant or to give a fair opportunity to the
defendant's counsel to assist him in his defense where charged with a
capital crime is a violation of due process of law under the Fourteenth
1995] 1337
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preme Court, despite opportunities to so do,27 did not fully in-
corporate the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment until 1963 in Gideon v. Wainwright."
The next question that the courts confronted was the mean-
ing of "effective assistance of counsel." The Court in Powell had
criticized the pro forma appearance of counsel that was less
than "zealous and active."29 Ten years later the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction on direct appeal holding that the defen-
dant had been denied the effective assistance of counsel where
his court appointed lawyer had a conflict of interest." Thus,
the Court intimated that the right to counsel includes some
measure of effective assistance of counsel.
If the right to the effective assistance of counsel were to have
meaning, then counsel in a given case would have to act in
conformity with some minimum level of attainment in order for
this new right to mean anything to the person charged with a
crime. The Supreme Court did not address the question of the
standard of reviewing a lawyer's effectiveness under the Sixth
Amendment until 1970."' While Glasser v. United States im-
plied an undefined standard of effectiveness,32 the Court did
not fully develop the standard of review until Strickland v.
Washington.33
Amendment.
Id. at 676.
27. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942):
The Sixth Amendment of the national Constitution applies only to trials
in federal courts. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantees found in the Sixth
Amendment, although a denial by a State of rights or privileges specifi-
cally embodied in that and others of the first eight amendments
may . . . operate . . . to deprive a litigant of due process of law in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth.
Id. at 461-62.
28. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
29. 287 U.S. at 58.
30. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
31. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
32. 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942); see also Reese v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955)
("The effective assistance of counsel in such a case is a constitutional requirement of
due process which no member of the Union may disregard.").
33. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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C. From "Farce and Mockery" to "Reasonably Effective
Assistance of Counsel"
Even before Powell some states required the appointment of
counsel in capital cases.' Indeed, the petitioners in Powell had
been entitled to counsel under the Alabama Constitution, 5 and
it had been argued that the defendants had in fact received the
services of counsel. Early state cases, operating under state
law, generally refused relief, regardless of how execrable
counsel's performance," even in capital cases." Thus, in
Obrien v. Commonwealth" the Supreme Court of Kentucky
refused relief to a condemned prisoner where his lawyer was
allegedly drunk during the trial. Courts almost never viewed
allegations of incompetency of counsel as "ground[s] for a new
trial."3
9
The general rule, was "that negligence, unskillfulness, or
incompetency of counsel [was] imputed to the client and the
client [was] bound thereby."' The condemned was bound, even
though the penalty of death "may [have been] too severe" (and
the Kentucky Supreme Court, speaking in 1922, feared it
was)4' because any excessiveness "of the penalty imposed by
the jury addresses itself to the clemency power of the Gover-
nor.""2 At least, unlike today, in the first half of this century
the clemency power was exercised with some frequency.
34. See Green, supra note 11, at 438 n.15.
35. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 48 (1932).
36. See, e.g., Fambles v. State, 25 S.E. 365 (Ga. 1895); State v. Benge, 17 N.W.
100 (Iowa 1883).
37. Sayre v. Commonwealth, 238 S.W. 737 (Ky. 1922).
38. 74 S.W. 666 (Ky. 1903).
39. Benge, 17 N.W. at 102.
40. Sayre, 238 S.W. at 739.
41. Id. at 740.
42. Id.
43. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency In Capital Cases, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. Soc. CHANGE 255 (1990-91). Professor Bedau traces the number of
commutations of death sentenced prisoners and points out that some years ago "about
one out of every four or five death row prisoners had his sentence commuted to life
in prison [whereas now] the frequency has dwindled to barely one in forty, a reduc-
tion by at least a factor of ten." Id. at 266 (footnote omitted). Bedau concludes that
"the prospect is not cheering, at least not for those who oppose the death penal-
ty. . . ." Id. at 272. This decline in the frequency of clemency commutations (often
from death to life imprisonment) has been noted by other scholars. See Paul Whitlock
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The Missouri Supreme Court succinctly stated the nearly
universal rule, and its basis, in 1897, when it disallowed relief
for the poor performance of a criminal defendant's trial counsel:
The neglect of an attorney is the neglect of his client, in
respect to the court and his adversary. The decisions are
too numerous to cite, but their uniform tenor is to the effect
that neither ignorance, blunders, nor misapprehension of
counsel, not occasioned by his adversary, is ground for set-
ting aside a judgment or awarding a new trial .... To per-
mit clients to seek relief against their adversaries upon the
alleged negligence or blunders of their own attorneys would
open the door to collusions, and would lead to endless con-
fusion in the administration of justice.'
The result was to leave a client with only a civil remedy for
malpractice against the attorney, cold comfort to the convict
where "the sentence of law will be carried into execution."45
Before Powell, even in the worst cases of gross incompetency,
relief was grudging and rare. Capital defendants with demon-
strably substandard lawyers were left with executive clemency
as the sole avenue for relief. The Supreme Court began the
process of change by dicta in a death penalty case that denied
Cobb Jr., Note, Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punishment, 99 YALE L.J.
389, 393-94 (1989); Joseph B. Schimmel, Commutation of the Death Sentence: Florida
Steps Back From Justice and Mercy, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 253 (1992). The most
comprehensive analysis of clemency decisions since the 1976 reinstitution of the death
penalty tracked all recent exercises of executive clemency and found that the majority
of those few death row inmates that do receive clemency received it as a result of
judicial expediency. These cases had been reversed by a court at some level, often
because of constitutional error, and in order to avoid the expense of retrial, the sen-
tences were commuted to life imprisonment, thus mooting any sentencing phase error.
Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency In Post-Furman Capi-
tal Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289, 293-97 (1993). When these cases are factored out
(along with the swan song mass commutations by outgoing Utah Governor, Toney
Anaya) humanitarian commutations have become "unavailable in practice". Bedau,
supra, at 266. Careful studies have shown that historically "the race of both defen-
dants and victims influenced decisions to grant clemency." Margaret Vandiver, The
Quality of Mercy: Race and Clemency In Florida Death Penalty Cases, 1924-1966, 27
U. RICH. L. REV. 315, 343 (1993). The present political climate appears to be a factor
in the clemency process. Bruce Ledewitz & Scott Staples, The Role of Executive Clem-
ency In Modern Death Penalty Cases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 227, 238 (1993).
44. State v. Dreher, 38 S.W. 567, 570 (Mo. 1897) (citations omitted).
45. Id. at 571.
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relief, despite the fact that counsel had only three days from
appointment to trial to prepare and had intervening trials:
But the denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to con-
fer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense,
could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and
nothing more than a formal compliance with the
Constitution's requirement that an accused be given the
assistance of counsel. The Constitution's guarantee of assis-
tance of counsel cannot be satisfied by mere formal appoint-
ment.46
This case, along with Glasser,47 plainly implied a right to more
than mere appointment of counsel. It implied at least some
undefined right to effective assistance of counsel. The lower
federal courts quickly recognized the tension between the indi-
gent defendant's right to effective representation and the time-
honored limits on the federal court's habeas jurisdiction. Feder-
al habeas courts had heretofore not ordinarily reached these
types of issues which had previously been considered
nonconstitutional trial issues.' In one of the earliest post-
Powell cases to confront the issue of counsel's ineffectiveness,
Diggs v. Welch, a federal appeals court pointed out that while
"[t]here must be 'effective' representation ... if that word be
construed in a broad and literal sense it would follow that on
habeas corpus the court would have to review the entire trial
and consider all the alleged mistakes. . . ."' The Diggs court
denied relief and intimated that the only circumstances war-
ranting habeas relief from inept defense counsel would be those
that "shocked the conscience of the court and made the pro-
ceedings a farce and a mockery of justice.""
While the Supreme Court continued to duck the issue,5 low-
46. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (footnote omitted).
47. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
48. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), which was overruled by a series of cases
beginning with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and culminating with
Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992), contains a useful history of the writ of
habeas corpus.
49. Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 669 (D.C. Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945).
50. Id. at 670.
51. See David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV.
1, 21 (1973); see also, Trapnell v. United States, 725 F.2d. 149, 151 (1983) ("By 1962,
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er courts struggled to give definition to this right. Most settled
on the "mockery of justice" test which compelled relief for attor-
ney incompetence only when counsel's performance was so poor
that it "shocks the conscience of the court."52 The "mockery of
justice" standard resolved the problem of whether a lawyer for
a criminal defendant fell below the constitutional standard by
sweeping the problem under a rug. Very few claims of shoddy
performance could fail to meet this undemanding standard.53
Trial and intermediate appellate courts feared a standard of
review that would have required that indigent defendants be
afforded reasonably effective assistance of counsel. Their reluc-
tance in formulating a standard of review that would allow any
appreciable number of cases to be seriously considered appears
to have been grounded in pragmatism. Criminal defense for
indigents has never been a high priority, and the quality of
lawyering in these cases has been criticized by a former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, as well as by two well respected
federal appeals court judges.54 If the courts took seriously the
requirement of affording effective assistance of counsel, the
appellate courts would be reversing half of all criminal convic-
tions."5 The courts would then be inundated with appeals and
retrials.
The "farce and mockery" or "mockery of justice" standard
generated a firestorm of scholarly criticism." Finally, Chief
nine of the eleven circuits were applying the Diggs 'farce and mockery' standard. The
two remaining circuits adopted the 'farce and mockery' standard in 1965 and 1970,
respectively.") (citations omitted).
52. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 28 n.76.
53. United States ex rel. Hall v. Ragen, 60 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1945) (holding
that a doctor who was licensed to practice law, but who was later disbarred, acted
competently).
54. Bazelon, supra note 51; Warren E. Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy:
Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates Essential to Our System of
Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 230-31 (1973); Irving R. Kaufman, Does the Judge
Have a Right to Qualified Counsel?, 61 A-B.A. J. 569 (1975).
55. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 22-23.
56. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 51; Joel J. Finer, Ineffective Assistance of Coun-
sel, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1077 (1973); Kaufman, supra note 54; Note, Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 49 VA. L. REV. 1531 (1963); Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel
For the Indigent Defendant, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1434 (1965); Comment, Effective Repre-
sentation-An Evasive Substantive Notion Masquerading As Procedure, 39 WASH. L.
REV. 819 (1964); Note, Incompetent Counsel As Ground For New Trial In Criminal
Cases, 47 COLuM. L. REV. 115 (1947).
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Judge David Bazelon, of the D.C. Circuit, took direct aim at the
courts for "papering over the problem."57 Charging that the
'mockery' test required such a minimal level of performance
from counsel to be itself a "mockery of the Sixth Amend-
ment,"58 he concluded that it was a pretense of justice to pro-
vide "an indigent defendant with a lawyer, no matter how inex-
perienced, incompetent or indifferent."59
Although change soon came, the change was grudging and
inadequate." Regrettably, increasing numbers of people are
being executed because of the incompetence of their lawyers.6
Even before Judge Bazelon's often quoted broadsides, a few
cracks had appeared in "farce and mockery's" uniform wall. The
Fifth62 and Third Circuits,63 as well as at least one state
court," had adopted variants of the "reasonably effective assis-
tance" standard for evaluating counsel's performance under the
Sixth Amendment. What began as a trickle became a flood
throughout the mid and late 1970s as most state courts65 and
all federal courts66 adopted some form of the "reasonably effec-
tive assistance" standard.
57. Bazelon, supra note 51, at 20.
58. Id. at 28.
59. Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
60. Although some might argue that conditions have improved somewhat, relief is
still rarely granted despite egregious examples of incompetence. See infra part II.G.
61. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 11; Goodpaster, supra note 6; Goodpaster, supra
note 14; Green, supra note 11; Klein, supra note 11; Robbins, Toward a More Just
and Effective System of Review In State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1
(1990); Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel In Capital Cases: The Evolving
Standard of Care, 1993 U. ILL. L REV. 323, 332 (ilEMmpirical evidence indicates that
at least in some jurisdictions the quality of representation in capital cases has not
improved and in fact may be deteriorating.").
62. Caraway v. Beto, 421 F.2d 636, 637 (5th Cir. 1970).
63. Moore v United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) ("This standard also
makes it clear that the ultimate issue is not whether a defendant was prejudiced by
his counsel's act or omission, but whether counsel's performance was at the level of
normal competency.").
64. State v. McCarthy, 298 A.2d 740, 742 (1972) ("The issue before us is whether
defendant's counsel possessed the skill to bring them 'within the range of competence
required of attorneys representing defendants in criminal cases'.") (citations omitted).
65. See generally, Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules and
Standards in State Courts as to Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of
Criminal Client, 2 A-L.R. 4th 27 (1980).
66. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 683 (1984).
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One reason for this, in addition to the wide scholarly criti-
cism of the "farce and mockery standard,"67 revolved around
the changing notion of the basis for the right to counsel. It will
be recalled that Powell68 found a due process right to counsel
predicated on the more general due process or fair trial con-
cerns of the Fourteenth Amendment. Once the Sixth Amend-
ment was incorporated into the Fourteenth by Gideon,69 courts
began to see the right to the effective assistance of counsel as
fundamental. The reasoning of the California Supreme Court in
People v. Pope was typical:
The reasons set forth by these courts and commentators for
replacing the "farce or sham" standard are compelling. The
standard originated in decisions which held that the right
to competent representation derived solely from the due
process clause of the Constitution and not from the provi-
sion guaranteeing the right to the assistance of counsel.
This view has been thoroughly discredited, for courts now
recognize that the right to competent representation at trial
is grounded in the constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel. Accordingly, constitutionally adequate assis-
tance ... must be determined by a standard bottomed on
the Sixth Amendment."
But what would that standard be?
67. See supra note 58.
68. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
69. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
70. People v. Pope, 590 P.2d 859, 864 (Cal. 1979) (citations omitted). Contra
Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730, 737 (3d Cir. 1970) (implying that the same
standard would apply regardless of which amendment is relied upon and holding the
standard to be one of "normal competency" of counsel).
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D. Strickland v. Washington: More Farce and Mockery
1. The "Reasonably Competent Counsel" Standard
a. The Standard of "Any Lawyer"
In 1984, Strickland v. Washington71 decided the matter. The
standard for effective assistance of counsel was that of reason-
ably competent counsel. Strickland provides a two pronged test
for relief from ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) counsel's
performance must fall below that of the hypothetical "reason-
ably competent counsel"; and (2) prejudice must have resulted
to the defense because of counsel's deficient performance. But
would the new test make any difference for capital defendants?
By the time David Leroy Washington's death sentence reached
the Supreme Court,72 there was little support for the "farce
and mockery" standard and an overwhelming progressive tide
in favor of the "reasonably effective assistance" standard.7" Yet
even the dissent of Justice Marshall intimated that the majori-
ty opinion so stringently cast the new standard that there was
little expectation that the new articulation would make any
practical difference.74 At the time, it was noted that the new
standard represented little departure from "farce and mock-
ery."75 Despite persistent indications of substandard perfor-
71. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
72. David Washington "confessed and pleaded guilty to three brutal murders and
to a lengthy series of associated crimes of violence. . . ." Washington v. Strickland,
673 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). Unit B of the former Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals "determined to have this case reheard en banc," Washington v. Strickland,
679 F.2d 23 ([5th Cir. Unit B] 1982), and, as a result of the reorganization of the old
Fifth Circuit dividing that court into two circuits (Pub. L. No. 96-452 (codified at 28
U.S.C. 41 (1993))), the newly formed Eleventh Circuit heard the case en banc. Wash-
ington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). That court determined
"that a habeas petitioner must show that his counsel's ineffectiveness caused 'actual
and substantial disadvantage' to the conduct of his case." Id. at 1250. The court then
remanded the case for further fact-finding under the court's newly announced stan-
dard. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
73. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 683-84.
74. Id. at 714 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
75. William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance
Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 181-82 (1984).
1346 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1327
mance by attorneys in capital cases,7 6 commentators document-
ed the paucity of successful challenges to death sentences."
Although studies have revealed a few reversals under the new
standard," far too many persons are on death row because of
incompetent counsel.79
Strickland remains a difficult case to grasp because it speaks
with two voices.8" In one voice the Supreme Court's opinion (in
Part II) constitutes a paean to the role of effective assistance of
counsel in promoting a fair trial for any criminal defendant.
The Court's language focuses on the role of effective counsel as
a precondition for a fair trial:
That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at
trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satis-
fy the constitutional command. The Sixth Amendment rec-
ognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it
envisions counsers playing a role that is critical to the
ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An
accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether
retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to en-
sure that the trial is fair."'
76. Goodpaster, supra note 6.
77. Ivan K Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 39
STAN. L. REV. 461, 470-80 (1987), points out that, despite numerous cases where
counsel's conduct was questionable, if not clearly ineffective, as of the writing of the
Note, only four capital defendants had gained relief because of trials that had been
tainted by poor lawyering, three of which came out of a single court of appeals, in-
cluding Jones v. Thigpen, 788 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1986); Blake v. Kemp, 758 F.2d
523 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 998 (1985); Tyler v. Kemp, 755 F.2d 741 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985); King v. Strickland, 748 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1016 (1985).
78. See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note and Comment, How to Thread the Needle:
Toward A Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 458 (1988). The author of that study conducted a comput-
er-assisted research study of ineffective assistance of counsel claims from Strickland
until May 30, 1988 and found that only 30 successful claims had been brought in the
circuit courts of appeals out of 702 cases during the period studied. Most of these
cases came from the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits. Many circuits had no
successful cases. Even these numbers are deceptive because they include cases involv-
ing ineffective assistance of appellate counsel where the only remedy is resumption of
the appeal. Thus appellate ineffective assistance of counsel has far fewer adverse
ramifications for the judiciary, and is far less important than trial error from the
perspective of one who may be facing a prosecution that involves the death penalty.
79. See infra part II.G.
80. Fong, supra note 77, at 481.
81. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).
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The Court accepts the nominally more liberal "reasonably effec-
tive assistance standard," 2 then changes voice and eviscerates
it. The naive reader, up to this point, might have supposed that
the opinion would belatedly apply the same standard of profes-
sional negligence to criminal defense lawyers as those that
apply in the civil realm to all other professions and callings. 3
That reader would have been wrong. In its second voice the
Court isolates the criteria by which lower courts are to evaluate
claims of Sixth Amendment violations. The new standards ap-
ply, without modification, to a capital sentencing proceeding."
By itself this might seem innocuous, but the same day that
the Court decided Strickland it also decided a noncapital inef-
fective assistance of counsel case-United States v. Cronic.85
When the two cases are read in pari materia the import of
Strickland's application to capital proceedings becomes clear.
Cronic involved the appointment of a neophyte real estate at-
torney to a complex mail fraud case. The lawyer, who had nev-
er handled a jury trial, had only twenty-five days to prepare;
82. Id. at 683-84, 687-88.
83. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, § 32, 185-93 (5th ed. 1984).
84. A badly fractured Supreme Court struck down all death penalty statutes in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Four years later the Court sustained "guid-
ed discretion" death penalty regimes in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), Proffit
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). At the
same time, the Court struck down mandatory death penalty laws in Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976).
The successful death penalty statutes all divided capital trials into two parts: a guilt
phase, and a penalty or sentencing phase. This second step is only reached if the
jury or judge has, at the first stage, found the defendant guilty of a capital crime, as
defined by statute. At the penalty phase the prosecution submits evidence in aggrava-
tion of the offense, and the defense is entitled to introduce evidence in mitigation.
See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95
(1979), Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). In most states, the jury (assuming a
jury trial) then decides whether the defendant lives or dies (in a few states, such as
Florida, the jury's verdict is only advisory). Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672. Alabama and
Indiana also allow the trial judge to sentence a defendant to death despite a jury's
recommendation of life. William S. Geimer & Jonathan Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote
Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 1, 12 n.48 (1988). For a discussion of how this bifurcated procedure works in Vir-
ginia, see Alan W. Clarke, Virginia's Capital Murder Sentencing Proceeding: A Defense
Perspective, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). The reasons for the extraordinary com-
plexity of the capital sentencing proceeding are detailed in the next section.
85. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
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the government had taken over four and one-half years to pre-
pare. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals inferred inadequate
representation from the circumstances.86 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, holding that the "criteria used by the
Court of Appeals [did] not demonstrate that counsel failed to
function in any meaningful sense as the Government's adver-
sary."8 7 This exposes the nub of the problem, particularly for
capital defendants: all that is required is some minimal ad-
versarial testing of the government's case, but it does not re-
quire that counsel have any knowledge, experience, or expertise,
regardless of how complex or difficult the case. Even a real
estate lawyer fresh out of law school has the wit to ask a few
reasonably pointed questions. This suffices, in the Court's opin-
ion, to meaningfully test the government's case. Thus, anyone
with a bar card can, and in many parts of the country does,
handle the most complex capital trial.
Reading both Cronic and Strickland, we learn that a lawyer's
defense of a capital defendant, at a capital sentencing hearing,
is to be judged not by the standards and professional norms of
people who regularly represent capital defendants, nor even by
the standards practiced by experienced criminal defense law-
yers. The pool from which we determine the performance stan-
dards in capital cases is that of all persons who have passed
the bar and possess a license to practice.88 Furthermore, it is
arguable that the standard actually applied will be the "local
professional norm"89 requiring the condemned person to use a
local expert to attempt to prove former counsel's incompetence.
In areas where the standard of practice is low this will have
the effect of further lowering the standard by which counsel's
performance will be judged.
A physician who holds herself out to be a specialist will be
held to the high standard of care applicable to specialists in the
field,9" and a physician who lacks sufficient expertise must
refer the patient to a specialist who possesses the requisite
86. Id. at 652.
87. Id. at 666.
88. Green, supra note 11, at 465.
89. Goodpaster, supra note 6, at 79.
90. D.E. Evins, Annotation, Physicians and Surgeons: Standard of Skill and Care
Required of a Specialist, 21 A.L.R.3d 953-54 (1968).
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expertise." This requirement that professional competency be
measured against others with similar superior knowledge or
skill applies to those of all other professions, including law-
yers,92 except criminal defense lawyers and, most tellingly,
criminal defense lawyers in capital cases. There, and only
there, does a basic license suffice.
One might argue that the criminal context is different, that
it is not the lawyer's competence that is at issue but the fair-
ness of the trial and thus, a different standard is appropriate.
Justice Marshall, in dissent, correctly observed that
"[sleemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by
good defense counsel" and one cannot confidently "ascertain how
the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up
against rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-pre-
pared lawyer."" There are experienced criminal defense law-
yers throughout the South's "death belt"94 who try dozens of
egregious capital murder cases without suffering a single death
sentence. This can be contrasted with the all too frequent ex-
ample of the novice who loses her first jury trial ever in a capi-
tal sentencing proceeding where life itself is the only issue.
Justice Stevens in Cronic dismissed the argument that this
complex mail fraud trial was seriously affected by the fact that
it was the young and nervous real estate lawyer's first jury
trial. The Justice asserted that "[elvery experienced criminal
91. Jerald J. Director, J.D., Annotation, Malpractice: Physician's Failure to Advise
Patient to Consult Specialist of One Qualified in a Method of Treatment Which Physi-
cian is Not Qualified to Give, 35 A.L.R.3d 349 (1971).
92. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 83.
93. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 710 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. has tracked and com-
piled statistics on every death row inmate, and every execution since the advent of
the modern death penalty statutes. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.,
Death Row U.S.A. (Summer 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Universi-
ty of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter Death Row USA]. Their Death Row USA
figures show that as of July 1993, five southern states (Texas, Florida, Louisiana,
Virginia and Georgia) accounted for 76.18% of all executions in the U.S. Thus, the
famous civil rights lawyer, Jack Greenberg, observes that the death penalty "has been
employed almost exclusively in a few formerly slaveholding states, and there it has
been used almost exclusively against killers of whites, not blacks, and never against
white killers of blacks." Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital
Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (1986). Thus, the South is often referred to as
the "death belt" by human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, and
The Southern Coalition on Jails and Prisons.
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defense attorney once tried his first criminal case."95 That is
indubitably true. But most good trial lawyers start with small
cases involving misdemeanors or small civil disputes-not capi-
tal cases. Saddling an indigent capital defendant (as all too
often happens) with inexperienced and ill-prepared counsel does
to the indigent what no knowledgeable paying consumer of
legal services would ever do-it entrusts a significantly complex
case, where the stakes are mortally high, to a neophyte. Gross
disparities in competence contribute to the reality that "[s]ince
at least 1967, the death penalty has been inflicted only rarely,
erratically, and often upon the least odious killers, while many
of the most heinous criminals have escaped execution."" Mere-
ly having a warm body that can propound a few reasonably
coherent questions does not constitute a fair trial any more
than having a chiropractor do neurosurgery constitutes fair or
competent brain surgery.97
b. Presumptions and Rules of Construction: A Springboard to
Vault the Lowered Threshold?
Strickland establishes a very low threshold standard for
evaluating the effective assistance of counsel." The subtext in
Strickland takes the already modest threshold standard for
evaluating a criminal defense counsel's competency, and gives
the lower courts marching orders to return, de facto, if not de
95. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984).
96. Greenberg, supra note 94, at 1670.
97. The metaphor of the chiropractor as brain surgeon to illustrate the inequity
in allowing an inexperienced person who happens to hold a bar card do capital litiga-
tion was used by capital defense lawyer Stephen B. Bright in his report to the Amer-
ican Bar Association Criminal Justice Section. Stephen B. Bright, American Bar Asso-
ciation Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of Delegates: Minority Report of
Stephen B. Bright, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 209, 219 (1990).
We are told that some states just do not have the money to attract qual-
ified lawyers and that in some places, particularly rural areas, there is
simply no one qualified available. These considerations should not excuse
lack of adequate legal representation in capital cases. There are many
small communities that do not have surgeons. But this does not mean
we allow chiropractors do to brain surgery in those communities.
Id. This metaphor was later used by Vivian Berger (Vice Dean at Columbia Law
School) in her article, The Chiropractor as Brain Surgeon: Defense Lawyering In Capi-
tal Cases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 249 (1990-91). Given the complexity of
capital cases compared to routine types of office practice, this analogy seems fair.
98. Genego, supra note 75, at 196.
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jure, to "farce and mockery." The hypothetical lawyer, who need
have no criminal defense experience, must still perform as
"reasonably competent counsel." Regardless of experience or
expertise, this standard is presumably better than no standard
at all. But how much better? For the Strickland Court a show-
ing that a lawyer's performance was deficient entails a "show-
ing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed... by the Sixth
Amendment."99 In other words, a lawyer's effort is "reasonably
competent" if it is perceived sufficient by the reviewing court if
the court finds the attorney to be functioning as counsel. It is
not immediately apparent how this standard differs from "farce
and mockery." In either case counsel must be barely better
than no attorney at all. Little wonder that one commentator
refers to the emperor Gideon as having no clothes,' while
others speak of defense lawyering in capital cases as being akin
to having chiropractors perform brain surgery.'
Lest a lower court be confused by the Supreme Court's oblig-
atory curtsey to the notion of a fair trial, the Court continued
to undercut the meaning of the phrase "reasonably competent
counsel":
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly
deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-
guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sen-
tence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's
defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A
fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every
effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hind-
sight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's chal-
lenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's
perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent
in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenge action "might be considered
sound trial strategy."'0 2
99. Stricldand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
100. Klein, supra note 11.
101. See Bright, supra note 97, at 219.
102. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citations omitted). Among other things, Justice
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Thus, the Court added a "strong presumption" that counsel in
fact cleared the competence hurdle and encouraged lower courts
to be deferential to trial counsel's exercise of judgment.103 Jus-
tice Marshall responded to these additional obstacles by charg-
ing that "'strongly presuming' that [counsel's] behavior will fall
within the zone of reasonableness, is covertly to legitimate
convictions and sentences obtained on the basis of incompetent
conduct by defense counsel." °4 Professor Goodpaster described
this presumption as "a result-oriented addition to the
Strickland 'reasonable competency' standard, designed to ensure
the discouragement and ready defeat of ineffective assistance
claims.' 05
After Strickland, the courts will rarely, if ever, seriously
review cases of substandard lawyering--even in capital cases.
The standard by which counsel's performance will be gauged is
the minimal performance required of all for passing the bar.
Reasonable assistance is defined as any minimal testing of the
government's case, such as being able to ask a few reasonably
related questions of the prosecutions witnesses. It does not
require adequate investigation, or the ability to mount a coher-
ent case in rebuttal. It does not even require the lawyer to be
able to make the appropriate legal motions and arguments.
Finally, the courts must apply a heavy presumption that the
lawyer has met this minimal burden. In addition, the courts
should defer to anything that can be characterized as a judg-
ment call, thus rendering anything that involves judgment
immune from attack. The rare convict or death row inmate that
can meet this demanding challenge is, however, not finished.
The Court erected a final barrier-the prejudice prong of
Strickland.
O'Conner's opinion at this point constitutes a non sequitur. It does not follow from
the difficulties inherent in evaluating a lawyer's performance that a presumption of
competency is called for. The same difficulties inhere in evaluating the competence of
all other professionals such as physicians, dentists, engineers or accountants. All must
exercise judgement. The courts have no problem in evaluating this without the aid of
any presumption of competency.
103. Id. at 691.
104. Id. at 713 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
105. Goodpaster, supra note 6, at 73.
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2. The Prejudice Component
The Strickland Court divides effective assistance of counsel
claims into two components: (1) the performance of counsel
must have been deficient (as discussed above); and, (2) "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense."' These are what are often referred to as the
"cause" and "prejudice" tests of Strickland. Both components are
equally important. As we will see, Strickland's prejudice prong
creates special problems for death sentenced habeas petition-
ers.
107
Even before Strickland, as courts groped toward a "reason-
able competence" standard, both state' and federal"° courts
began to append a requirement that the defendant whose trial
suffered from inept lawyering show that she was prejudiced by
the substandard attorney performance. The courts developed a
variety of standards governing the requirement that a defen-
dant show prejudice. For example, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit appears to have viewed it as a burden shifting
device. A defendant had first to show that her counsel's inade-
quacy prejudiced her defense."0 Once that was accomplished,
the government had the "opportunity to prove beyond a reason-
able doubt that counsel's deficiencies were harmless.""' On
the other hand, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals required a
showing of actual prejudice (which appears to be outcome deter-
minative with a vengeance) under either the "farce and mock-
106. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
107. This has peculiar significance to death row prisoners bringing successor peti-
tions. A death sentenced petitioner bringing a successive, abusive, or defaulted habeas
claim has a much heavier burden of proving actual innocence of the death penalty,
which, under Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992) requires for relief a showing
that his or her execution "would be a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Id. at
2524. Counsel's failure-even if prejudicial-to mount an available line of mitigating
evidence is, at this juncture, insufficient. Petitioner must prove much more; she must
undercut the elements that make her death eligible.
108. Sarno, supra note 65, at 83-99.
109. Goodpaster, supra note 14, at 345-352.
110. United States v. Hinton, 631 F.2d 769, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
111. Id. at 771; see also, Knight v. State, 394 So.2d 997, 1001 (Fla. 1981).
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ery" test"' or under the "reasonable competence" test."3 The
Third Circuit Court of Appeals required the defendant to "prove
that he was prejudiced by his counsel's incompetency," 4
while the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, upon a showing of
attorney incompetence, cast the burden upon the state to prove
lack of prejudice." 5
Strickland ended the confusing profusion of standards for
evaluating prejudice. According to Strickland, "[a]n error by
counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error
had no effect on the judgment.""' The conviction cannot be re-
versed unless the attorney error was "prejudicial to the de-
fense.""7 Prejudice was defined as "a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the out-
come.""' The Court summarized the test:
When a defendant challenges a conviction, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt
respecting guilt. When a defendant challenges a death sen-
tence such as the one at issue in this case, the question is
whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the
errors, the sentencer-including an appellate court, to the
extent that it independently reweighs the evidence-would
have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigat-
ing circumstances did not warrant death."'
Although courts are enjoined to avoid the "distorting effects of
hindsight"2 ' when evaluating counsel's performance, they
112. Lipuma v. Department of Corrections, 560 F.2d 84, 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 861 (1977).
113. United States v. Aulet, 618 F.2d 182, 187 (2d Cir. 1980).
114. United States v. Swinehart, 617 F.2d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 1980).
115. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 849
(1968).
116. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984).
117. Id. at 692.
118. Id. at 694.
119. Id. at 695.
120. Id. at 689.
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must gaze backward (reweighing the evidence in some
cases"s) to determine whether death was warranted.
The jury's decision, in a capital sentencing proceeding, is
solely to determine life or death." 2 That determination is
emotional and complex.' Under Strickland's prejudice prong,
the death sentenced prisoner undertakes the sisyphean task of
proving "how a sentencing authority would have responded
emotionally to evidence the sentencer did not hear."124
Strickland's prejudice requirement establishes a far heavier
burden for a habeas corpus petitioner than might otherwise
appear upon a superficial reading. Habeas corpus proceedings
are statutory, and are often first heard by the trial judge who
originally sentenced the petitioner to death. 5 After that, the
121. Two years after Strickland, the Supreme Court in Cabana v. Bullock, 474
U.S. 376, 392 (1986), held that a state appellate court could correct a deficiency in
the findings at the trial by independently reweighing the evidence, or conducting
harmless error analysis. This allowed federal courts to remand a defective case (as
where the jury had not been properly instructed on the intent requirement before a
death sentence could be imposed) to the same state appellate courts that had already
denied relief. These courts, in turn, could supply (without any rehearing at the trial
level) the missing fact finding either by reweighing the evidence or by harmless error
analysis. See Clemmons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990). This method of salvaging
defective death sentences reached its apex in Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106 (4th
Cir. 1991) cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1591 (1992). There, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that the Supreme Court of Virginia's proportionality review of Willie
Jones' death sentence in 1984 cured all sentencing phase error. Id. at 1117. The
supreme court was required statutorily to review all death sentences, and to "inde-
pendently evaluate the propriety of the sentence." Clarke, supra note 84 at 358.
Jones' jury had been instructed in the disjunctive on the meaning of "Vileness" such
that the jury could have split any number of ways in determining whethe the crime
was sufficiently vile to warrant death. Jones, 947 F.2d 1116. Thus, the defendant was
denied assurance of jury unanimity on this point. The Fourth Circuit held that the
supreme court's generalized review of the sentence cured this problem, citing Cabana.
Id. at 1117. Cabana was not decided until 1986 so the supreme court could not have
been doing the task ascribed to it by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. Not only
that, Cabana-style reweighing does not apply in any event to nonspecific proportional-
ity reviews. See, e.g., Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1140 (1992). Willie Jones
was executed by the Commonwealth of Virginia at Jarret at 11:00 P.M. on September
15, 1992. Sue Anne Pressley, Killing Me Softly with His Song, WASH. POST., Sept. 11,
1992, at Fl.
122. Clarke, supra note 84, at 341-42.
123. Cf Geimer & Amsterdam, supra note 84 (explaining the complexity of at-
tempting to determine why jurors vote life or death).
124. Goodpaster, supra note 6, at 84.
125. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-654(B)(1) (Michie Repl. Vol. 1992 & Cum.
Supp. 1995); In re High Pine, 535 P.2d 174 (Mont. 1975); In re Buccheri, 431 P.2d
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case goes through an elaborate appellate process. 12  In the
federal habeas proceedings, the matter will proceed on the basis
of a cold record, without additional evidence ore tenus, unless
the state trial court failed to give the petitioner a full and fair
and adequate hearing or failed to meet one of the other narrow
procedural technicalities of 28 U.S.C. § 2254.127 Thus, a habe-
as petitioner's only realistic opportunity to make a record is be-
fore the same judge that originally imposed the death sen-
tence.'28
A criminal defendant's right to trial by jury is fundamen-
tal.'29 The trial bar tends to see the jury as somewhat less
hardened and more open to argument, unlike a trial judge who
sees many difficult cases, and who may be less willing to allow
emotional considerations to palliate the severity of the sentence.
Nonetheless, once trial counsel fails to adduce appropriate,
available and mitigating evidence before the sentencing authori-
ty (often a jury), the condemned's only remaining recourse on
habeas review is to persuade the trial judge who originally
91, 102 (Ariz. 1967) ("Nor do we believe it proper that new factual allegations be
made for the first time in this, an appellate court. The general law seems well estab-
lished that a habeas corpus petitioner must first present his case to the trial court."
(citations omitted)).
126. See supra note 9 for an explanation of the various steps in a typical capital
habeas proceeding.
127. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(6) (1988). If petitioner for any reason fails to fully develop
the record before the state trial court she is thereafter barred from raising the issue
unless she can meet the stringent "cause and prejudice" test of Keeney v. Tamayo-
Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 6 (1992), which overruled Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
By applying the demanding "cause and prejudice" test to failure to fully develop a
state habeas record, the majority in Keeney arguably overruled Congress judicially.
See Keeney, 504 U.S. at 12 (O'Connor, J., Blackmun, J., Stevens, J., and Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
128. This same state trial judge's findings of fact will be entitled to a presumption
of correctness by the federal district court in its habeas review under 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1988). This means that the facts on all subsequent habeas review will be those
determined by the state habeas judge, unless one of the narrow exceptions of 28
U.S.C. § 2254 happens to apply. What constitutes a full, fair, and adequate hearing,
and the other exceptions is beyond the scope of this paper. Because of Keeney, a
death sentenced habeas petitioner must try to plead and prove everything that is col-
orable at the state habeas hearing. The state's attorney will resist and make it diffi-
cult to make the appropriate record, and where the ruling is against the petitioner,
the state's attorney will usually volunteer to draft the order so as to insure that the
fact findings will be impregnable on appeal and on federal habeas review.
129. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-54 (1968).
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imposed the death sentence3 0 (and who also may have ap-
pointed the allegedly incompetent trial lawyer'31) that there is
"a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been differ-
ent."'32 Where the facts of the crime are particularly egre-
gious, a reviewing court is practically invited to assume that no
amount of mitigating evidence would have made any difference.
As Professor Green states: "[p]recisely because so little is un-
derstood about how juries exercise their discretion, it will be
difficult to prove convincingly that lawyers' poor performance
made a difference, even if it did." 3
Trial judges (particularly in small rural jurisdictions where
all bar members and judges know each other intimately) may
well be reluctant to criticize trial counsel's performance.
Strickland invites the court to take the path of least resis-
tance-to simply find that even if errors occurred, those errors
did not prejudice the defendant:
Although we have discussed the performance component of
an ineffectiveness claim prior to the prejudice component,
there is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assis-
tance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or
even to address both components of the inquiry if the defen-
dant makes an insufficient showing on one. In particular, a
court need not determine whether counsel's performance
was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object
of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's perfor-
mance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim
on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we ex-
pect will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts
should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not be-
come so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire
criminal justice system suffers as a result.'34
Courts that depend on local lawyers continuing to take criminal
appointments can be expected to be sympathetic to the com-
130. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.5 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1995).
131. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-183 (Michie Repl. Vol. 1993).
132. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984).
133. Green, supra note 11, at 503.
134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
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mand that they avoid allowing ineffectiveness claims to become
burdensome to defense counsel. After all, this same judge (who
sentenced petitioner to death, perhaps appointed defense coun-
sel in the first instance, and practiced law in the jurisdiction
before elevation to the bench) is likely to need the goodwill of
the bar in order to keep the courts running smoothly.
Strickland requires trial judges to perform a nearly impossible
task-to extricate themselves from their surroundings and back-
ground-and then to accurately determine the subjective weight
that a jury of twelve would have attached to evidence that was
never presented.
The cause and prejudice requirements combine to create a
nearly insurmountable obstacle confronting all habeas petition-
ers. They are particularly daunting to the death sentenced
petitioner. Cronic and Strickland appear to be "designed to help
reviewing courts deal efficiently with these claims rather than
seriously address the potential injustice problems caused by
incompetent trial counsel.""' The Courts refusal to deal with
this problem realistically appears to be part of a larger trend
by the Court that is hostile to the "results of relevant social
science findings" and is "[u]nfettered by empirical evidence
relating to capital punishment administration."" 6 The current
Court emphasizes judicial efficiency and finality over other
values, such as fairness or accuracy. Because Strickland creates
such a demanding standard of review, few cases are reversed
for reasons of ineffective assistance of counsel. This allows
those who are willing to reason circularly to conclude that bad
lawyering is not much of a problem for the criminal justice
system. Reality is otherwise.
E. Would a Checklist Approach Help?
Several commentators have suggested that the courts and the
bar respond to Strickland's challenge by developing a checklist
or performance-based criteria for evaluating the effective assis-
135. Goodpaster, supra note 6, at 67.
136. James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical Research
Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 L. & SocVy. REV. 65, 80-
81 (1993).
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tance of counsel.'37 These efforts to develop performance stan-
dards can help courts in determining the minimum that any
lawyer must do. Experienced capital defense lawyers, for exam-
ple, know that mitigating evidence exists in virtually every
capital case. Failure to aggressively search for mitigating evi-
dence in capital cases astounds competent and knowledgeable
lawyers. Yet courts can and do find that the failure to even
look for mitigating evidence does not violate Strickland.8'
Would a performance standard that required counsel either to
look for mitigating evidence, or to have an extremely compelling
reason for the failure to so do, cause courts to view this issue
differently? If it did, then performance standards would have
served a useful function.
There are two potential problems with attempting to set out
criteria or performance standards for the effective assistance of
counsel. First, many of these standards will have to be articu-
lated at such a level of generality as to be of little utility to a
court. For example, one proposed criterion is that "[diefense
counsel must interview the defendant as soon as practicable to
determine all relevant facts known to the defendant and must
explain to him the attorney's obligation of confidentiality and
the importance of fully disclosing all relevant facts.""9 Beyond
telling the court and counsel what common sense should al-
ready have mandated-that the lawyer should talk to the client
and discuss confidentiality and the need for full disclosure-the
standard does little to show how an effective interview should
be conducted. Presumably one short meeting would satisfy this
standard even in the most complex capital case.
Second, and more importantly, checklists have an insidious
way of fostering a checklist mentality. Any checklist is merely a
guide, a way of ensuring that one has not forgotten a step. The
danger is that the checklist will become an end in itself. Nei-
ther counsel nor a reviewing court should assume that counsel
was effective simply because a checklist was followed. Check-
lists do not ensure that counsel has understood the governing
137. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 11; Calhoun, supra note 78.
138. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, .1027 (1987), (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
139. Calhoun, supra note 78, at 438.
1995] 1359
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1327
law, made the appropriate motions, understood the facts, and
prepared a coherent strategy. So long as the standard governing
counsel's performance is that of any lawyer (and not that of
criminal defense or capital defense lawyers), checklists by them-
selves will be insufficient. Indeed, they may hinder the develop-
ment of law in this important area if they are used to justify
shoddy attorney performances in capital cases. While checklists
may help address some of the absurdities created by Strickland,
they cannot replace human judgment and should not be used to
justify incompetent attorney performance.
F. The Court Applies Strickland: Lockhart v. Fretwell
The most striking cases joining arrant fatuity, counsel, and
the condemned appear in numerous lower court opinions. Few
cases, however, better illustrate the complexity, subtlety, and
difficulty of these cases than the recent Supreme Court case
Lockhart v. Fretwell.
140
In 1985, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Collins v.
Lockhart" decided that the Arkansas death penalty statute
unconstitutionally failed to narrow the class of persons eligible
for the death penalty where the sole aggravating circumstance
found by the jury duplicated an element of the crime. The Fifth
Circuit rejected the Eighth Circuit's reasoning shortly thereaf-
ter,' thus creating a conflict between the circuit courts of ap-
140. 113 S. Ct 838 (1993).
141. Collins v. Lockhart, 754 F.2d 258 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1013
(1985). In Collins, the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury was that the
murder was committed for pecuniary gain. Id. at 263. This circumstance duplicated
an element of the underlying crime, that the murder was committed in the course of
robbery. Id. While this double counting did not violate state law, the Eighth Circuit
held, relying on Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) and Zant v. Stephens, 462
U.S. 862 (1983), that this scheme failed to appropriately narrow the class of persons
eligible for the death penalty. Id. at 263-64. Thus, according to the Eighth Circuit,
the statute, as applied, violated both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
142. Wingo v. Blackburn, 783 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1986). Wingo involved aggravat-
ed burglary, aggravated escape and armed robbery, all of which were both elements
of first degree murder in Louisiana, and aggravating circumstances at the penalty
phase of trial. Wingo, relying on Collins, argued that this duplication of the elements
of the crime to show aggravating circumstances (where there were no other aggravat-
ing circumstances found) violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
1051. The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Collins' analysis stating, "[w]e fail to
see why aggravating circumstances narrow the sentencing discretion any less by being
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peal on this important Eighth and Fourteenth amendment
issue.' The Supreme Court resolved the conflict in
Lowenfield v. Phelps,' holding that such double counting did
not violate the Constitution. The Eighth Circuit relying on
Lowenfield, reversed its decision in Collins.' Thus, between
Collins (January 1985) and Lowenfield (October 1987), there
was a window of opportunity for alert and competent defense
counsel in Arkansas to avoid having the ultimate penalty im-
posed in the narrow class of capital cases where the sole
aggravators mirrored elements of the offense.
Bobby Ray Fretwell's lawyer was neither alert nor competent.
The only aggravator in Fretwell's case, murder for pecuniary
gain, was a constituent element of the underlying rob-
bery/murder case. The jury instructions in Fretwell's case
squarely violated Collins, which had been decided eight months
previously. Fretwell was convicted and sentenced to death, and
his case began the laborious series of direct and habeas ap-
peals. The federal district court, on habeas review, noted that
double counting had been prohibited in the Eighth Circuit for
more than four years." The district court found "trial
counsel's ignorance of Collins to have been a serious and signif-
icant error."4" It was also prejudicial, according to the district
court, because, had the issue been properly raised, there was
"no reason to believe that the trial court would have chosen to
disregard" Collins, and therefore, Fretwell's death sentence
flowed directly from the attorney error." The district court
was attempting to apply Strickland, and the Eighth Circuit
made a constituent element of the crime." Id.
143. A conflict between decisions of the courts of appeals in circumstances in-
volving an important issue of federal law will "usually, but not necessarily" result in
a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court. "[A] square and irreconcilable conflict ...
ordinarily should be enough to secure review." Robert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court
Practice § 4.4 at 197 (6th ed. 1986).
144. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
145. Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1393 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989) ("We conclude, therefore, that Collins can neither be harmonized with nor
distinguished from Lowenfield, and we therefore deem it to have been overruled by
Lowenfield.").
146. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 739 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 n.2 (E.D. Ark. 1990), affd, 946
F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
147. Id. at 1337.
148. Id. at 1337-38.
149. Id. at 1336.
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agreed, saying that there was "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."5 ° This analysis seems
flawless. Once the district court found ineffective assistance of
counsel, it appears beyond peradventure that the result would
have been different had the appropriate objections been made
and preserved. Yet the Supreme Court reversed.' The major-
ity neither disputed that counsel had been "so deficient that it
met the Strickland standard,"5 ' nor did the Court seriously
question that counsel's error was prejudicial, at least under
Strickland's original formulation.'53 But the majority, with the
benefit of hindsight, reasoned that the accuracy of the proceed-
ing was not affected (Fretwell was, after all, guilty and the no
double counting rule had been overruled, albeit after Fretwell's
case). Thus, even though Strickland appeared on its face to
apply, the fair trial basis (which the Court now equates with
innocence) did not apply, and therefore, the rule would not
apply to this case: "the 'prejudice' component of the Strickland
test does not implicate these concerns. It focuses on the
question whether counsel's deficient performance rendered the
result of the trial or the proceeding fundamentally unfair.""
Fretwell's message to the few lower courts that still had not
gotten the message was clear. Absent a clear case of innocence
of the death penalty, that is, a provable absence of one of the
constituent elements of a capital crime, the Supreme Court will
not countenance reversals of death sentences, even where
counsel's goof clearly (as it did in Fretwell's case) affected the
result. When Cronic, Strickland, Sawyer v. Whitley, and
Fretwell are read together, it becomes clear that very few
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can ever succeed. The
petitioner must have had truly abysmal lawyering, and since
the court seems to equate the fairness of the trial with inno-
cence, the defendant must prove innocence in at least some
sense (including the odd concept of innocence of the death pen-
alty) before relief will be forthcoming. While Fretwell does not
150. Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (1991).
151. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993).
152. Id. at 850 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 851 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 844.
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appear to be the worst possible example of attorney incompe-
tence, it does show what can happen when a lower court at-
tempts to apply Strickland's fair trial language, while faithfully
applying the announced criteria. The Supreme Court majority's
impatience with the delays inherent in death penalty habeas
cases is well known. Fretwell provides one more example of how
the Court is dealing with that impatience.'55
G. Horribles56
One cannot know, much less recount, all of the egregious
examples of indifference to inferior attorney performances in
capital cases since Strickland. What can be demonstrated is
that attorney conduct in capital cases is often execrable. Inept
lawyering can, and often does, fall below that which any one of
us would tolerate from our own lawyer, doctor, dentist or ac-
countant. Yet under the present lax criteria, lawyers who are
impaired by drugs or alcohol, who conduct little or no investiga-
tion, who are ignorant of basic legal principles, and who are
venal, lazy, indifferent and foolish, are found by the courts to
have competently performed while losing capital cases. Some
are even later disbarred; yet their clients are still executed.
What follows is an impressionistic review of some of the cases
that demonstrate the need to reconsider the present standard of
review in ineffective assistance of counsel cases, particularly
where the death penalty is involved.
1. Smith and Machetti: Death as a Lottery
John Eldon Smith, aka Tony Machetti, his wife Rebecca
Adkins Smith Machetti, and John Maree plotted the murder of,
155. Fretwell also involved the application of a new rule on habeas review in so
far as Lowenfield had overruled Collins. Application of new rulings on habeas corpus
review had been prohibited by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Not surprisingly,
the Court majority found this to be no impediment-Teague was now to apply only
against habeas petitioners that happened to be prisoners and the rule never would
work against the state.
156. The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., which is commonly
known as the LDF, prepared and disseminated a two page document entitled
"Horribles," which summarized a few of the more egregious instances of inept
lawyering in capital cases.
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and then killed, Rebecca Machetti's former husband, Joseph
Adkins and his wife, Juanita.5 7 The evidence against Maree
was the strongest so he struck a deal, 5' testified against the
others, and received a life sentence.'59 Smith and Machetti re-
ceived death sentences. 60
Both Smith and Machetti had volunteer lawyers on their first
state habeas cases; Machetti's pro bono lawyer specialized in
employment discrimination, Smith's in utilities law.' 6'
Machetti's discrimination lawyer challenged, for the first time
in state habeas, the composition of the jury that convicted her
because it systematically underrepresented women. Although
this issue was technically subject to a procedural default for
having been raised for the first time at state habeas, 6' the
Georgia courts denied the claim on the merits, thus paving the
way for federal habeas review. 6  The Eleventh Circuit sus-
157. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1983).
158. Id. at 1476 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1463-65.
160. Rebecca Machetti's case is reported: Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127 (1983).
161. Ronald J. Tabak, The Death of Fairness: The Arbitrary and Capricious Impo-
sition of the Death Penalty in the 1980's, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 797, 840
n.312 (1986).
162. The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), had held
that a statute that excluded women from jury duty unless they opted in was uncon-
stitutional. "In January, 1979, one year after the filing of Machetti's federal habeas
corpus petition, the Supreme Court, in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S. Ct.
664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), held unconstitutional a state opt-out statute which also
exempted women from jury service on request." Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236,
239 (11th Cir. 1982). The rule in Duren was held to have retroactive application in
Lee v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 461 (1979). Thus, the only possible bar to retroactive appli-
cation of the rule in Duren would be if there were a valid procedural default. A fed-
eral habeas corpus court cannot review an issue that was not properly raised and
preserved in the state trial courts in violation of the state's contemporaneous objec-
tion rule absent a showing of "cause" for the noncompliance and a showing of "preju-
dice." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). One of the ways in which one might
show both cause and prejudice for a procedural default is to show that counsel was
ineffective under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), which has its own
"cause" and "prejudice" requirements. Thus, the claim that counsel was ineffective is
inextricably intertwined with the notion of procedural default. Most, but not all,
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel result from some default (that is a missed
claim or objection) at or on appeal. Conversely, most defaulted claims, but not all,
result in a claim on habeas review that the default resulted from the ineffective as-
sistance of counsel.
163. Machetti, 679 F.2d at 238 n.4. Federal courts must hear an otherwise pro-
cedurally defaulted claim on the merits of habeas review if the state appellate or
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tained her claim, ordered a new trial, "and, at that trial, a jury
which fairly represented the community imposed a sentence of
life imprisonment."'' Smith's lawyers failed to raise the jury
composition issue on the first state habeas "because they were
unaware of the U.S. Supreme Court decision on point."165 Both
Smith and Machetti had identical claims. Machetti's case was
heard on the merits, he procured a new trial, and he lives.
Smith's claim was not heard; he was executed. 166  Judge
Hatchett, concurring in part and dissenting in part, summed up
the arbitrariness of this death sentence:
This case again illustrates the difficulty, if not the impossi-
bility, of imposing the death penalty in a fair and impartial
manner. It is a classic example of how arbitrarily this pen-
alty is imposed. Maree, who bargained to receive $1,000 for
the murder and on whom the evidence was the strongest, is
eligible for parole in November 1983. He will live because
the evidence against him was overwhelming and the prose-
post-conviction courts do not rely on the default and decide the merits of the issue. If
it is not clear from the state court's opinion whether it is relying on the default or
deciding the merits, the Supreme Court has ruled that the "plain statement" rule of
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) applies to federal habeas corpus proceedings.
Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989). This rule permits a federal court to reach the
otherwise defaulted federal question "unless the state court's opinion contains a 'plain
statement' that [its] decision rests upon adequate and independent state grounds." Id.
at 261. Adequate and independent state grounds can include application of a state's
procedural default or contemporaneous objection rules. There appears to be some
weakening of the "plain statement" rule in federal habeas corpus as defendants at-
tempt to take advantage of one of the few remaining avenues for avoiding the impact
of a procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). Ironically,
the original usage of the "plain statement" rule in Michigan v. Long was to reverse a
state court that had been overly generous in its application of the constitutional pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, as applied to the trunk and
interior of an automobile. The Michigan Supreme Court had excluded the "fruit" of
the search, thus establishing a rule favorable to the defendant. Once habeas prisoners
began to use the rule to their advantage, the Supreme Court narrowed its application
in the Coleman case by allowing the habeas court to look beyond the bare record to
deduce the state court's reliance on the procedural default. Coleman 501 U.S. 722
(1991). This allowed the federal courts to avoid a merits review of Roger Coleman's
death sentence. Coleman's case attracted world-wide attention as his lawyers at Ar-
nold and Porter attempted to establish his innocence. See, e.g. Steve Twomey, Night
of Brutality on Death Row, WASH. PoST., July 2, 1992, at D1. He was executed by
the Commonwealth of Virginia on May 22, 1992. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 94.
164. Bright, supra note 97, at 212.
165. Id. at 211 n.7.
166. Id. at 212.
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cutor needed his testimony to convict Smith and Machetti.
Thus, a deal was struck.
Machetti, the mastermind in this murder, has had her
conviction overturned, has had a new trial, and has re-
ceived a life sentence. This court overturned her first con-
viction because in the county where her trial was held,
women were unconstitutionally underrepresented in the jury
pool. Machetti v. Linahan, 679 F.2d 236 (11th Cir. 1982).
Her lawyers timely raised this constitutional objection. They
won; she lives.
John Eldon Smith was tried in the same county, by a jury
drawn from the same unconstitutionally composed jury pool,
but because his lawyers did not timely raise the unconsti-
tutionality of the jury pool, he faces death by electrocution.
His lawyers waived the jury issue. Judicial economy, as
required by recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, dictate that we not reach the underrepresentation of
women issue, even under principles of "manifest injustice."
The fairness promised in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), has long been forgot-
ten. 167
The Smith case does not represent gross incompetence of
counsel. At most it represents neglect, and, indeed, in so far as
the rule is that counsel is not constitutionally required for ha-
beas corpus proceedings, 6 ' even for capital cases,'69 it does
not involve a constitutional question of ineffective assistance of
counsel at all. This case, along with Fretwell, illustrates the
dramatic difference that effective lawyering can make. Even the
worst cases can be won in the sense that the defendant receives
a life sentence rather than death, where counsel is truly effec-
tive; other cases can result in a death verdict where the attor-
ney is indifferent. Unlucky defendants lose the lawyer lot-
tery7 ° and these cases are not rare.'7 '
167. Smith v. Kemp, 715 F.2d 1459, 1476 (1983) (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
168. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
169. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989).
170. Bright, supra note 97, at 212.
171. See Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims In Capital Cases Due To Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92
W. VA. L. REV. 679 (1990).
Yet Smith is hardly an isolated example. The second person executed in
Georgia was a mentally retarded offender, who was denied relief despite
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Even though innocence was not at issue, we still should be
troubled by this case. The arbitrary imposition of the death
penalty on the least culpable party solely because he had the
worst lawyer is unjust. Arbitrariness is a fact of life in the
criminal justice system; it is inevitable and tolerable in ordi-
nary cases. Certainly the outcome of any case may depend on
how good one's lawyer is, and a system of justice can only go so
far in correcting these kinds of inequities. But the death penal-
ty is different. Death should not be capriciously imposed on
those who cannot afford competent counsel and who lose the
luck of the draw in receiving court appointed counsel. This level
of arbitrariness calls into question the validity of the death
penalty itself and demonstrates the overlap between the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel and the Eighth Amendment right
to be free of cruel and unusual punishments. Is it not cruel and
unusual punishment to impose death as the penalty because
someone cannot afford competent counsel?
2. John Young-The Lawyer as Drug Abuser
John Young murdered three elderly people in their own
homes." 2 The jury rejected his insanity plea and imposed the
death sentence." Young's trial lawyer, who was later dis-
barred,' 4 admitted to a drug problem, but "felt it had never
interfered with his practice of law.""5 The trial lawyer, who
had disappeared, was not available for the first habeas hear-
ing, 76 and the second proceeding was thereby saddled with
the additional burden of being a successor petition. 7 As Ron-
ald J. Tabak describes it:
a jury instruction which unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof on
intent because his attorney did not preserve the issue by raising an
objection at trial. His more culpable codefendant was granted a new trial
on the unconstitutional instruction. Again a switch of the lawyers would
have reversed the outcomes of the two cases.
Id. at 695-96 (citations omitted).
172. Young v. State, 236 S.E.2d. 1 (Ga.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1002 (1977).
173. Young, 236 S.E.2d at 2.
174. Tabak, supra note 161, at 841.
175. Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d 1489, 1492 (11th Cir. 1984), cert denied. 470 U.S.
1009 (1985).
176. Tabak, supra note 161, at 841.
177. Young v. Kemp, 758 F.2d 514, 515 (11th Cir. 1985).
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As a result of this lawyer's incompetence, the jury never
learned that Young, at the age of three, had witnessed the
murder of his mother while he was in bed with her. Nor
was the jury told about a psychiatric evaluation which had
found that Young may have suffered from post-traumatic
stress syndrome, an illness often present in children who
have been affected by homicides.
The federal courts also refused to consider Young's claim
that the prosecutor in his case had made the same type of
closing argument that has been held unconstitutional and
highly prejudicial in other cases. The courts held that
Young was barred from raising that claim because his law-
yers did not obtain a transcript of the closing argument and
did not raise the issue sooner.178
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion failed to even
discuss trial counsel's failure to adduce this psychiatric evi-
dence. It concluded cursorily that defense counsel "presented a
vigorous and capable defense. Petitioner has failed to carry his
burden of establishing that counsel's representation was defec-
tive to the point that he was constitutionally ineffective.79
The extreme variance between the court's and Ronald J.
Tabak's rendition of the facts of this case calls into question the
integrity of the process. Has the court fairly addressed the facts
of the case, or did it decide the case and then address only
those facts which tended to support the decision?
3. John Sterling Gardner-Lawyer As Drug Abuser Redux
John Sterling Gardner murdered two workers at a Steak and
Ale Restaurant in Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Evidence
surfaced after his first round habeas claims had been adversely
decided. His lawyers, hoping to circumvent the draconian rules
concerning successor petitions, attempted to have the case re-
heard under the "'newly discovered' evidence prong of Rule 60
(b)(2)."18' In an attempt to secure an evidentiary hearing,
Gardner's habeas attorneys proffered seven affidavits alleging
178. Tabak, supra note 161, at 841-42 (citations omitted).
179. Young v. Zant, 727 F.2d at 1493.
180. Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1992) (LEXIS, Genfed li-
brary, Omni file).
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that the trial attorney had abused drugs during the entire time
that he was preparing and trying Gardner's case. The state
proffered affidavits containing the attorney's denial and various
court officials' opinions that the attorney appeared alert and
competent. The affidavit from the trial attorney's former wife,
as reported by the Fourth Circuit and corroborated by the other
affidavits, is startling in its detailed description of the lawyer's
cocaine and alcohol abuse, his drug binges and his resultant
irresponsible behavior. 8' This, together with the other corrob-
orative affidavits, was not sufficient according to the Fourth
Circuit, to even merit a remand for an evidentiary hearing.
John Gardner was executed on October 23, 1992.182
There is a tension, if not an outright contradiction, in the
Fourth Circuit's treatment of this case. At one point the court
says that "Gardner simply does not identify, in any way or
manner, any action that Fraser could have taken to enhance
his chances of success."" The court, not surprisingly, con-
cludes from this that petitioner failed to establish that counsel's
performance was deficient. The court then turns to the preju-
dice component of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
There the court acknowledges that petitioner's claim is that had
counsel not "neglected his duty to investigate, he could have
discovered and presented ... testimony" of petitioner's
"childhood woes."" The court fails to elaborate what this evi-
dence might be and simply concludes that it was merely cumu-
lative of evidence that was presented at trial; therefore, the
failure to present the evidence was not prejudicial. Whatever
this evidence may have been, it is clear that habeas counsel did
identify actions that trial counsel could have taken to have
improved petitioner's chances. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals' cursory treatment of the facts leaves us in the dark
about how important this testimony might have been. However,
the court's cavalier treatment of the facts leaves one profoundly
unsettled at the result. Few people would want their lives to
depend upon the investigation and preparation of a drug-de-
pendent lawyer. This case is troubling; it demonstrates just how
181. Id. at *17-19.
182. Death Row U.S.A., supra note 94.
183. Gardner, at *13.
184. Id. at *14.
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demanding and unfair the prejudice prong of Strickland is. One
has the sense that a much better case in mitigation could have
been made in Gardner. Would that have made a difference?
Strickland places the burden of proof on the petitioner to affir-
matively establish prejudice. That is a burden few petitioners
will be able to carry where the claim is only that trial counsel
failed to discover and produce additional available mitigating
evidence.
4. Billy Mitchell-No Investigation Is Good Enough
Billy Mitchell was executed in 1987 in Georgia. 5 His court
"appointed attorney made no attempt to interview any potential
mitigating witnesses.... Counsel made no inquiries into his
client's academic, medical, or psychological history.""6 Accord-
ing to Justice Marshall,
Counsel's failure to investigate mitigating circumstances left
him ignorant of the abundant information that was avail-
able to an attorney exercising minimal diligence in fighting
for Billy Mitchell's life. The affidavits of individuals who
would have testified on petitioner's behalf fill 170 pages of
the record in the District Court. Among these potential
witnesses are family members, a city councilman, a former
prosecutor, a professional football player, a bank vice presi-
dent, and several teachers, coaches, and friends.
Had defense counsel tapped these resources, he would have
been able to present the sentencing judge with a picture of
a youth who, despite growing up in "the most poverty-
stricken and crime-ridden section of Jacksonville, Florida,"
had impressed his community as a person of exceptional
character. He had been captain of the football team; leader
of the prayer before each game; an above-average student;
an active member of the student council, school choir,
church choir, glee club, math club, and track team; a Boy
Scout; captain of the patrol boys; and an attendant to the
junior high school queen....
185. Berger, supra note 11, at 248.
186. Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1027 (Marshall, J., dissenting), denying cert.
to 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985).
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An account of what happened to this well-adjusted young
person was also readily available to anyone who took the
time to ask. When petitioner was 16 years old, his parents
were divorced, and soon thereafter petitioner got into trou-
ble. He and two friends were arrested for attempted rob-
bery. Petitioner professed his innocence, but was persuaded
by his father to plead guilty .... Petitioner was sentenced
to six months in prison, where he was subjected to repeated
violent homosexual attacks, experienced severe depression,
and lost 30 pounds. When he was released, he continued to
be highly depressed, and eventually committed the crime for
which he received a sentence of death.18 '
Justice Marshall's stinging dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in this case came on the same day that the Supreme Court
decided in another case that presentation of no mitigating evi-
dence constituted sufficient competency from a court appointed
lawyer." One might imagine a hypothetical case where inves-
tigation of mitigating evidence would be prohibitively difficult.
Furthermore, one might imagine a valid excuse for the failure
to seek mitigating evidence. However, there will be available
mitigating evidence in most cases, and one cannot know what
an investigation might turn up until one has looked. Therefore,
Justice Marshalls dissenting conclusion in Mitchell, that coun-
sel ought always to look for mitigating evidence, is sound.
H. The Capital Sentencing Proceeding Is Uniquely Difficult
One partial measure of the difficulty or complexity of nearly
anything revolves around cost. Death penalty cases are surpris-
ingly expensive, costing up to one million dollars per trial."8 9
The reasons for this inordinate expense when compared to more
ordinary criminal litigation have been well documented and
187. Id. at 1027-29 (citations omitted).
188. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987).
189. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Elizabeth R. Walsh, Capital Punishment or Life
Imprisonment? Some Cost Considerations, 23 LOY. LA. L. REV. 45, 52-54 (1989); Ron-
ald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-of-Benefit
Analysis of the Death Penalty, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 59, 133-138 (1989). This expense
is only the beginning since most capital defendants then begin the appeals and habe-
as rounds which also are more expensive than in other more usual types of criminal
litigation.
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appear to be inherent.90 Cost, however accurate it may be as
a marker, remains a peculiarly unsatisfying and unilluminating
way to understand complexity. This is especially true when life
itself hangs on the balance of that complexity. The scandalously
penurious payments to court appointed trial counsel'9 ' no
doubt contributes to the often miserable performance by law-
yers in capital cases. But it fails to explain, or at least provides
an inadequate account of, this systemic failure. Even otherwise
competent and diligent lawyers find capital litigation difficult.
Commentators have pointed out for nearly a decade that
"[clapital murder trials present a unique challenge" because
"[t]he lawyer who focuses entirely on the guilt stage without
attending to the sentencing stage may be consigning his client
to the electric chair."'92 The problem that even good lawyers
often have lies with the unique and, to most trial lawyers,
totally alien nature of the penalty phase of a capital trial.
Judge Heaney's dissent in one case illustrates the problem:
"This case presents a scenario all too common in capital cases:
trial counsel focused all of his energies on the guilt phase of
the trial and virtually ignored the crucial 'trial for life' during
the penalty phase."'93
Lawyers all too often do a competent job of investigating and
trying the guilt phase of a capital trial while neglecting, failing
to understand, and ultimately bungling the penalty phase. The
reasons are simple. The guilt phase of a capital trial is much
like the trial of any other criminal case, and it is ordinarily the
part that many lawyers attend to first. The penalty phase con-
founds many otherwise competent lawyers, not only because it
190. See Barry Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 69
(1978). Professor Nakell points out that the bifurcated trial process, the use of expert
witnesses, the exploration of defendant's life at the penalty phase, the increased use
of juries, and the need for such cases ordinarily to be tried rather than plead all
contribute to the expense of capital litigation. The article goes on to illustrate how
and why the entire appellate and habeas process costs so much.
191. Tabak, supra note 161, at 801-03. For example, until recently, the average fee
for death penalty lawyers in Virginia was $687 per case, and in Florida the maxi-
mum fee was $3500. The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a $1000 fee cap in capital
cases. Even though these low fee schedules are changing, securing adequate compen-
sation for capital cases remains an impediment to competent representation of per-
sons charged with capital crimes. See id.
192. Clarke, supra note 84, at 341.
193. Schlup v. Armontrout, 941 F.2d 631, 647 (8th Cir. 1991).
1372
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS
is vastly different, but also because there is an inherent ten-
sion, sometimes approaching outright contradiction, between the
goal of the penalty phase and that of the guilt phase. The nor-
mal combative inclination of most trial lawyers (and neophyte
would-be trial lawyers with more Matlock than experience to
inform their instincts) is to focus all energies on seeking an
acquittal that will bring glory and approbation. In most
noncapital cases, if not over-done, this is a useful, if distasteful,
part of the adversary system. We rightly expect zealous advoca-
cy from criminal defense lawyers. We expect advocates to take
considered risks. For capital defendants this inclination can,
and often does, lead to utter ruin. Prosecutors, quite naturally,
like to win. They tend to aggressively seek the death penalty
when the evidence is strong and the probability of conviction is
high. The prosecutor will have the "right to cull the venire of
jurors who are so opposed to the death penalty that they can-
not abide by their oaths to consider the death penalty; this
yields a jury that is willing to find guilt" 94 and impose the
death penalty. Thus, complete denial combined with headlong
resistance at the guilt phase renders the defendant in a pecu-
liar position at the penalty phase. How does one credibly argue
to the jury that "I didn't do it, but if I did I am sorry?" Often
some of the best life saving arguments are short-circuited by
the strategic decision to combat the guilt stage full-bore. And
where counsel, whether experienced or not, remains unaware of
this tension between the two phases of trial, the decision to put
all energies into contesting the guilt phase can hardly be said
to be a strategic decision.
Even when defense counsel appropriately recognizes this
tension between the two trial stages, the penalty phase is
uniquely difficult. Marie Deans, one of the foremost mitigation
specialists in the U.S., eschews the lawyer as lone gunslinger
approach. She recommends a team approach to capital litiga-
tion, utilizing mitigation specialists who are "investigators,
paralegals, social workers, psychologists and others who have a
thorough understanding of mitigation and how it works into the
capital trial and who are skilled interviewers."'95 Lawyers
194. Clarke, supra note 84, at 353.
195. Marie Deans, The Case In Mitigation In the Capital Case, (Mar. 17, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Richmond Law Review).
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rarely have strong skills in these areas, often fail to recognize
their own limitations in attempting to do these things (that
appear to be easier than they are) and, sadly, often do not
recognize the need until too late. The enormity of the job also
daunts counsel. Even where one realizes the need, the resources
to interview family, friends, teachers, coworkers, pastors, and
the like, together with collecting all of the records necessary to
construct a complete life history for the accused'96 is a huge
and, for those who are not prepared for it or who fail to under-
stand it, impossible task.
In many cases the client is mentally and intellectually dis-
turbed; the nuclear family is dysfunctional. Both the client and
family may confabulate, cover up, forget, and otherwise make it
difficult for the lawyer to construct a persuasive case in mitiga-
tion. The trial lawyer may not learn of all of the good mitiga-
tion evidence that was readily available until the habeas law-
yers, who will have conducted a proper investigation, bring it
out. By then it is often too late.
The use of experts is quite different in death penalty cases.
Many lawyers understand and effectively present straightfor-
ward insanity defenses. Few understand the sophisticated op-
portunities and pitfalls presented by the use of mental health
experts pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma.'97 Few lawyers are pre-
pared to combat the states' use of "Dr. Death" psychiatrists who
testify to the alleged future dangerousness of the accused. It is
not easy for lawyers, who may lack insight into the process, to
196. Id.
197. 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Ake held that where a defendant made a preliminary
showing that the sanity of the accused was likely to be a significant issue at trial
the defendant was entitled to have a psychiatrist at state expense if she could not
otherwise afford one. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court held that
psychiatric testimony regarding a defendant's future dangerousness was admissible at
the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Id. at 896-99. A number of states' psychia-
trists, such as Dr. James Grigson of Texas, regularly testify that these defendants
will be dangerous in the future. These doctors are often referred to by the ironic
appellation "Dr. Death" for the number of times that they testify to future dangerous-
ness. Because of the power that this sort of "scientific" evidence has with juries, The
American Psychiatric Association is critical of this type of diagnosis because
"[pisychiatric categories have little or no demonstrated relationship to violence, and
their use often obscures the unimpressive statistical or intuitive bases for prediction."
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 931-32 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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see how use of mental health experts can, without testifying to
insanity, place the crime, which may otherwise appear to be
inexplicable, in a mitigating context that allows the jury to see
the accused as a flawed person rather than as a less than hu-
man monster.9 '
Often lawyers see only their client's sordid history, replete
with repeated crimes, and become disheartened. Or they fail to
understand the need for a thorough investigation of mitigating
evidence. Experienced capital defense lawyers, however, argue
that "[t]he defendant's social history will 'always disclose miti-
gating evidence' that can aid the defendant at the sentencing
stage. If the attorney did not find it, it was because he 'didn't
look hard enough.""99
Penalty phase trials are complex, alien creatures that can,
and do, ensnare otherwise competent lawyers. Lawyers such as
the ones that Smith, Young, Gardner and Mitchell had could
never hope for even a glimmer of comprehension of the com-
plexity and subtlety of even the simplest capital case. Sadly,
the majority of the Supreme Court Justices likewise fail to
appreciate the nature of their own creation.
I. Proposals
This paper has demonstrated how the right to counsel has
been seriously undermined by the Supreme Court's narrowly
pinched view of the right of a capital defendant to face the ulti-
mate penalty armed with reasonably competent counsel. A per-
son on trial for life is entitled to counsel that is prepared to
fight for that life with vigor, skill and determination. The pro-
posals that follow will ensure that no one will be condemned to
death without a fair trial, a trial that the public can have confi-
dence in, and a trial whose result is reliable.
First, lawyers in death penalty cases should be certified.
Minimum experience requirements are crucial. No capital defen-
dant should face trial with a lawyer who lacks significant jury
198. For an excellent discussion of the problems associated with the use of psy-
chiatry in capital cases see Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatry and the Death Penalty:
Emerging Problems in Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167 (1980).
199. White, supra note 61, at 342.
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trial experience in serious felony and murder cases. Since there
should be at least two defense lawyers in any capital case, the
lawyer or lawyers who sit second chair could have less trial
experience than lead counsel. In this way, new or inexperienced
lawyers will be trained. In order to maintain capital-case certif-
ication, a lawyer should undergo continuing legal education in
capital punishment issues as well as general criminal practice
each year. At least some states have begun tentative, if inade-
quate, procedures to certify capital defense attorneys. °0
Second, while checklists of performance standards have their
limitations, the bar should set minimum standards for perfor-
mance in a capital case with the understanding that these
standards should not be deemed to be exclusive or determina-
tive. However, some things need to be done in virtually every
capital case, and standards established by the bar can make
this point. While the bar cannot make law, one would assume
that bar sponsored performance standards for capital case liti-
gation would be persuasive in many courts. For example, attor-
neys should investigate the existence of mitigating evidence in
virtually all capital cases. The failure to investigate should ordi-
narily be strongly indicative of inadequate performance absent
a compelling explanation for the failure to investigate.
Third, and most importantly, the test for determining wheth-
er counsel has performed adequately in a capital case should be
measured against the standards and norms of what is reason-
able among the capital defense bar in the nation as a whole (at
least that part of it that retains capital punishment). The stan-
dard by which counsel is judged should not bottom on the per-
formance standards applicable to anyone who happens to pos-
sess a bar card; neither ought we revert to a locality rule,
where the standard is gauged by whoever the 'good old boys' of
200. Virginia, for example, now requires that lawyers in capital cases at trial, on
appeal, and on state habeas review, be appointed from a list compiled by the Public
Defender Commission. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-163.7 (Cum. Supp. 1994). The author
played a peripheral role in drafting some of the initial legislation and was present
when the Virginia House of Delegates' Courts of Justice Committee weakened the
original proposals. The present standards, although not as strong as needed to insure
adequate representation in capital cases, are an improvement. Another state with a
program for establishing qualifications to try capital cases is Ohio. Ohio C.P. Rule
65(I)(A)(1). For an excellent article on the meaning of licensure on capital cases see
Green, supra note 11.
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the local bar happen to be. Once the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of prejudice, the burden needs to be on the
state to establish the lack of prejudice beyond a reasonable
doubt. The burden of making a prima facie showing should be
akin to a simple showing of probable cause to believe that
counsel's errors affected the jury's verdict in any way, including
its disposition to impose the death penalty. Failure to present a
coherent case in mitigation, when mitigating evidence exists,
should in ordinary circumstances be enough to warrant an
inference of prejudice.
If states truly wish to execute the most heinous murderers
they will continue to be able to do so. Granting a capital defen-
dant competent counsel will not change this. If the jurisdictions
wishing to execute find that poorly tried cases simply have to
be retried, often years down the road, then the states them-
selves will ensure that competent lawyers are provided to see
that the job is done right the first time. Ford did not remedy
the Pinto (whose gas tank exploded on contact) until it suffered
defeat in the courts. The same incentive, applied to the states
in the form of reversals by habeas courts in capital cases with
directions to retry the petitioner, will indubitably have a salu-
tary effect.
The present system of appointing and evaluating the perfor-
mance of defense counsel in capital cases is not working. While
the same may be true to a lesser extent in the entire criminal
justice system, it is in the death penalty arena that the situa-
tion concerns life itself. These cases are so much more complex
that they justify different treatment on that ground as well.
Thus, the goal of this section has been to advocate change in
this most limited class of cases, where life itself hangs in the
balance.
IMl. THE EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES REQUIREMENT OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
A. Introduction: The General Rule Requiring Exhaustion of
State Remedies
The doctrine compelling state prisoners to exhaust state ave-
nues of relief before proceeding in federal habeas corpus was
13771995]
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created judicially in 1886 by Ex parte Royall.2°' This rule gave
federal trial courts discretion, as a matter of comity," 2 to re-
fuse to consider a claim until the state courts had received an
opportunity to act.2"3 Codification in 1948204 rendered the re-
quirement mandatory. The Supreme Court's case law strictly
enforces this statute."' A federal habeas court may not enter-
tain an unexhausted claim even though the violation of consti-
tutional rights is clear."' Although the rule is mandatory, it
201. 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
202. "Comity" refers to this principle "in accordance with which the courts of our
state on jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another, not
as a matter of obligation, but out of difference and respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
267 (6th ed. 1990). The states within the United States are not independent nations
with respect to the federal government, so the doctrine does not, strictly speaking,
apply. However, courts in the United States frequently use the term by analogy, to
refer to the respect that the various courts (when not constrained by positive law,
such as the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution) owe to each other. The
federal courts in particular, when deferring to state courts, will speak of doing so as
a matter of comity. For example, the Supreme Court in Ex parte Royall, in its opin-
ion which deferred to the Virginia courts, quoted Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176,
182 (1883), in the course of the decision:
[Tihe forbearance which courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction, administered
under a single system, exercise towards each other, whereby conflicts are
avoided, by avoiding interference with the process of each other, is a
principle of comity, with perhaps no higher sanction than the utility
which comes from concord; but between State courts and those of the
United States it is something more. It is a principle of right and of law,
and, therefore, of necessity.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 252.
203. Ex parte Royal, 117 U.S. at 251.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
(b) An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available
in the courts of the State, or that there is either an absence of available
State corrective process or the existence of circumstances rendering such
process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if
he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available
procedure, the question presented.
205. See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). However, until Rose v.
Lundy, trial judges apparently retained some discretion with respect to hearing
unexhausted claims. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952). Even now, some
extremely limited discretion is retained by the intermediate appellate courts (and
perhaps, to an even lesser extent, the trial courts) in the event that the state inad-
vertently fails to promptly raise lack of exhaustion as a defense. This is discussed
more fully in section D infra.
206. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1 (1981).
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is not jurisdictional, ' and can be waived under certain cir-
cumstances. The rules surrounding the exhaustion requirement
are not as complex as some of the other jurisprudential habeas
thickets-such as procedural default or ineffective assistance of
counsel issues. The consequences of a mistake, which can result
in loss of claims in some instances,"'8 warrants careful atten-
tion to the exhaustion requirement.
B. Defining the Claim for Exhaustion Purposes
The exhaustion doctrine requires "that the substance of a
federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the state
courts.""9 This dictates that "once the federal claim has been
fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement
is satisfied."210
What constitutes a fair presentation to the state courts?
Picard v. Connor held that a "claim that an indictment is inval-
id is not the substantial equivalent of a claim that it results in
an unconstitutional discrimination."21" ' While a federal claim
must be substantially equivalent to the claim presented in state
court, it need not be identical. A petitioner "need not spell out
each syllable"" of the federal claim in the state court. Fur-
thermore, a federal habeas court may, in its discretion, "'supple-
ment and clarify' the state-court record presented for re-
view."213 Thus, the doctrine requires petitioner to fairly pres-
ent the legal and factual bases of the claim, but presentation of
the substance suffices. Federal habeas courts need not, and
should not, engage in hyper-technical parsing of the claim pre-
sented to the state with a view to finding a shade of difference
for exhaustion purposes. Presentation of additional facts in
207. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
208. The dilemma faced by death row prisoners who may have to choose between
the loss of their federal stay of execution and running the risk of running afoul of
the abuse of the writ rule is discussed in section E infra. Failure to properly exhaust
a claim can also result in a procedural default which can mean loss of the claim.
209. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278 (1971).
210. Id. at 275 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 278 (citations omitted).
212. 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
5.3 at 54 (1988).
213. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 257 (1986).
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support of the base claim,214 or the citation of additional legal
authority,215 that do not change the underlying legal theories,
will not render the claim "unsuitable for federal habeas review
without prior consideration by the state courts."216 Petitioner
must assert the federal basis for the claim; presenting the state
with a claim based solely upon state law fails to exhaust one's
remedies despite similarity to a later federal claim. State courts
should have a "fair opportunity" to address the federal
claim."
Justice O'Connor's dissent in the denial of certiorari in Vela
v. Estelle," demonstrates continuing sentiment among some
Justices for a more stringently applied exhaustion requirement.
This would, in one commentator's opinion, authorize federal
habeas jurisdiction "only upon submission of a photocopy of the
state petitions."2"9
Framing the issue in terms of fair presentation presents two
problems. First, there is the question of whether there is sub-
stantial identity of legal and factual issues between fora. Any
change in the pleadings between state and federal court is
fraught with potential danger. A court that is inclined to rigidly
enforce the exhaustion doctrine may rule that the changes suf-
fice to render the claim new and, therefore, unexhausted. This
possibility propels counsel counter to the opposing force of strict
pleading requirements22 ° in federal habeas corpus; these
pleading rules impel counsel to attempt to plead as much detail
as possible even at the risk of markedly modifying pleadings.
Second, with substantial disagreement amongst Justices at
the Supreme Court over how much change renders a claim new
for exhaustion purposes, a petitioner cannot be certain that the
rules will remain constant even during the course of the litiga-
214. Id. at 257-58.
215. Liebman, supra note 212, at 54-55.
216. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 257.
217. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S.
270 (1971)).
218. McKaskle v. Vela, 464 U.S. 1053 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
219. Thomas G.F. Del. Beccaro, The Exhaustion Rule and Habeas Corpus Proce-
dure: The Plain Statement Solution-A Long Time Coming, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
161, 180 (1987).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1988) (providing for fact pleading).
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tion. Death penalty habeas petitions can take years. Changes
are sometimes necessary. Diligent counsel will continue to work
on their case. Lawyers are well advised to reinvestigate during
death penalty federal habeas corpus proceedings, yet any devia-
tions from the way in which issues were framed in the state
proceedings may generate problems.
C. What Constitutes Exhaustion
1. The Meaning of "Remedies Available In the Courts of the
State"
The exhaustion statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988), precludes
habeas relief "unless it appears that the applicant has exhaust-
ed the remedies available in the courts of the State.. . ." The
drafters of this language had earlier failed in an attempt to
nearly "eliminate the federal courts' power to entertain petitions
from state prisoners.""' They apparently intended this lan-
guage to "eliminate, for all practical purposes, the right to ap-
ply to the lower federal courts for habeas corpus in all states in
which successive applications may be made .... to the state
courts.... " If this view had prevailed, and if a state al-
lowed successive post-conviction procedures without applying res
judicata or collateral estoppel, then a state prisoner could forev-
er be locked in state court litigation. Access to the federal fo-
rum would be barred regardless of how often or how decisively
the prisoner's claims had been rejected. This literal construc-
tion, however, was not adopted by the Supreme Court.
A claim is fairly presented, and thus exhausted, when it has
been asserted in the highest state court that has the power to
consider it. Brown v. Allen" held that the exhaustion doc-
trine does not require that a claimant exhaust all avenues of
state review. The Court said "[w]e do not believe Congress
intended to require repetitious applications to state courts.""2
221. Larry W. Yackle, The Exhaustion Doctrine in Federal Habeas Corpus: An
Argument for a Return to First Principles, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 411 (1983).
222. Id. at 412.
223. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
224. Id. at 448-49 n.3.
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Most constitutional claims will ordinarily have to be present-
ed to the trial and appellate courts on direct review.2m This
suffices to exhaust these claims. Other claims, most notably
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, will ordinarily require
the development of an evidentiary record in a state post-convic-
tion proceeding.225 Petitioner will also be required to employ
any post-conviction appellate processes that are available. A
claim need only be presented one time through one full state
trial or evidentiary hearing and the attendant appellate process,
in order to be exhausted. If the state court chooses to address a
claim on the merits which is presented for the first time on
appeal, that too constitutes exhaustion.2 7 A claim is not fairly
presented, and is not exhausted, when presented for the first
time to a state appellate court that declines to decide the issue,
under discretionary review procedures limited to review only
when "'there are special and important reasons therefor."' 2' A
state court's refusal to entertain a claim that was not fairly
presented will be respected by the federal courts. Petitioner is
not required to seek certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court from an adverse state appellate ruling to exhaust a
claim.229
2. Mixed Petitions: The Rule of Rose v. Lundy
Federal petitions for habeas corpus are often prepared by
prisoners pro se, or by other prisoners. Death row petitions can
be extremely complex. Thus, federal courts are frequently faced
with mixed petitions-that is, habeas petitions that contain a
mixture of exhausted and unexhausted claims. In Rose v.
225. If not presented at the proper times and in the appropriate manner under
state law, these claims may, in many jurisdictions, be subject to the bar of procedural
default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72 (1977).
226. States have no constitutional obligation to provide post-conviction proceedings,
and, if a state does choose to provide a post-conviction process, it need not appoint
counsel where petitioner is indigent, even though the case involves the death penalty.
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
227. LIEBMAN, supra note 212, at 47.
228. Castile v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (quoting PA. R. APP. P. 1114).
229. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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Lundy,"' the Supreme Court dismissed the prisoner's petition,
"leaving the prisoner with the choice of returning to state court
to exhaust his claims or of amending or resubmitting the habe-
as petition to present only exhausted claims to the district
court."2"' In her majority opinion Justice O'Connor advised
petitioners, "before you bring any claims to federal court, be
sure that you have first taken each one to state court."232 It is
doubtful that state prisoners acting pro se will understand,
much less heed, this admonition.233  The intricacy of death
penalty habeas corpus procedures renders compliance with this
rule problematic.
3. State Remedies that are Inadequate or Futile
The federal habeas statute accords state fact-finding a pre-
sumption of correctness.' This presumption receives rigorous
enforcement in the federal courts." s States that wish to cir-
cumscribe federal habeas oversight have a strong incentive to
provide post-conviction evidentiary hearings because the court's
findings of fact will generally be respected by the federal courts.
Nonetheless, cases occasionally crop up 23 that meet the Su-
230. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
231. Id. at 510.
232. Id. at 520.
283. Justice O'Connor justifies this stringent enforcement of the exhaustion doc-
trine:
A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners
to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the
first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. As the num-
ber of prisoners who exhaust all of their federal claims increases, state
courts may become increasingly familiar with and hospitable toward fed-
eral constitutional issues.
Id. at 518-19.
234. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988). This rule admits of a number of exceptions that
are beyond the scope of this paper. See id. § 2254(d)(1)-(8).
235. At least some of the Justices would go beyond rigorous enforcement of this
presumption and would treat state fact-finding as res judicata. Such a rule would
reverse Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See, e.g., Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277
(1992) (Justice Thomas's plurality opinion). Cessation of the federal court's ability to
develop a factual record in appropriate cases would virtually end modern federal
habeas corpus practice. Furthermore, failure to develop a claim in state court has,
under this statute, been held to require rigorous cause and prejudice analysis before
such failure to develop the factual record can be excused. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes,
504 U.S. 1 (1992).
236. See IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CORPUS CHECKLISTS § 10.07, 10-18 to 10-33
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preme Court's futility exception to the rule requiring exhaus-
tion. "An exception is made only if there is no opportunity to
obtain redress in state court or if the corrective process is so
clearly deficient as to render futile any effort to obtain re-
lief."237 Many of these cases involve inordinate delays in the
state's appellate process.231 Others involve "futile' state proce-
dures, i.e., ones that offer no possibility of success."239 Still
others involve rulings by the highest state court in a different
case that is squarely against petitioner's claim.' ° Because
most state officials perceive it to be in the state's interest to
foreclose federal intervention, these cases are relatively rare.
D. Waiver by the State-Granberry v. Greer
While the exhaustion rule is strictly enforced, it is not juris-
dictional.24' It follows that a federal court has the power to
determine an unexhausted claim should the state fail to object.
But what is the court's duty when a failure to exhaust is belat-
edly asserted by the state? In Granberry v. Greer the state
asserted petitioner's failure to exhaust for the first time on
appeal. The Supreme Court confronted three possibilities. 2 2 It
could have: (1) treated the state's failure to assert timely the
exhaustion issue in the federal district court as a procedural de-
fault, thus treating the issue as waived; (2) treated the exhaus-
tion issue as nearly jurisdictional, and thereby dismiss the case
under the rule of Rose v. Lundy; or (3) given the district courts
discretion to "decide whether the administration of justice
would be better served by insisting on exhaustion or by reach-
ing the merits of the petition forthwith."2' The Court chose
the third option.
(1994 ed.) for an exhaustive listing of cases in which exhaustion was excused where
further proceedings in state court would have been inadequate or futile.
237. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981).
238. ROBBINS, supra note 236, § 10.07.
239. LIEBMAN, supra note 212, at 51.
240. Id. at 51-52.
241. Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131 (1987); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 684 (1984).
242. 481 U.S. 129 (1987).
243. Id. at 131.
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The Court recognized that:
As the Strickland case demonstrates, there are some cases
in which it is appropriate for an appellate court to address
the merits of a habeas corpus petition notwithstanding the
lack of complete exhaustion. Although there is a strong
presumption in favor of requiring the prisoner to pursue his
available state remedies, his failure to do so is not an abso-
lute bar to appellate consideration of his claims.'
The Court noted three criteria that should inform a lower court
in deciding whether a state's failure to raise the exhaustion
question should excuse a failure to exhaust. Where "the case
presents an issue on which an unresolved question of fact or of
state law might have an important bearing"' the case should
ordinarily be dismissed to compel exhaustion. When petitioner
raises a meritless issue, the court may simply dismiss the case
without forcing a meaningless return trip to the state
courts.' Finally,
if a full trial has been held in the district court and it is
evident that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, it may
also be appropriate for the court of appeals to hold that the
nonexhaustion defense has been waived in order to avoid
unnecessary delay in granting relief that is plainly warrant-
ed. 2 7
While a clear violation of a state prisoner's constitutional rights
alone will not excuse a failure to exhaust, it can work in tan-
dem with an inadvertent state waiver of the issue to give the
federal district judge discretion to excuse exhaustion. This ex-
ception will rarely be applied. It is hard to imagine even the
most inept state's attorney contesting a meritorious constitu-
tional defense while omitting a potentially successful exhaustion
defense. The return trip to the state courts could highlight a
previously undetected procedural default or, because this first
submission of the claim to state court may be procedurally late,
it may even create the procedural default. Few state's attorneys
244. Id. at 131.
245. Id. at 134-35.
246. Id. at 135 & n.7.
247. Id. at 135.
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will miss such an important issue. The exception excusing ex-
haustion where the claim is meritless will probably be the most
used.24
A state may expressly waive the exhaustion requirement.
This is often done to expedite an execution.249 This generally
will be allowed. °
E. The Death Row Dilemma
The exhaustion doctrine intersects curiously with the 'abuse
of the writ' doctrine in Habeas Corpus Rule 9(b). 251 A new
claim brought in a subsequent habeas petition constitutes an
abuse of the writ unless petitioner can show both cause for her
failure to present the claim in the initial petition and preju-
dice.22 In order to meet this standard a prisoner--even one
248. Cf. David B. Franks, Federal Court Discretion and the Exhaustion Doctrine:
Granberry v. Greer, 26 CRIM. L. BULL. 210, 225-29 (1990) (discussing cases that have
applied this exception). For a recent example in a death penalty case dealing with a
late assertion of an unexhausted meritless issue see Spann v. Martin, 963 F.2d. 663,
673 (4th Cir. 1992) ("any dismissal to allow a reexhaustion . . .is an abuse of dis-
cretion, because the claim is obviously frivolous, and a dismissal at this stage of a
federal habeas proceeding would only add to the embarrassing length of time that
has elapsed since the case was filed in the federal courts.").
249. Cf. Richard J. Bonnie, Preserving Justice in Capital Cases While Streamlining
the Process of Collateral Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 113 (1991) (states' attorneys
are the strongest supporters of the present exhaustion doctrine because they "prefer
for fact-bound claims to be heard by state judges." (citations omitted)). Professor Bon-
nie points out the irony in this "because state officials should want to expedite collat-
eral review rather than perpetuate the most inefficient aspect of the process." Id.
250. See Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1637
(1994), for an example of an express waiver by the state prosecutor in a death penal-
ty case. For a non-death penalty case where the prosecutor waived exhaustion, and
the issue was later determined to be meritless, see Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d. 1418
(6th Cir. 1987).
251. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1994).
252. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 493 (1991). The cause and prejudice
standard now applies to a variety of situations all relating to some error or omission
by petitioner or her counsel.
Unless a habeas petitioner shows cause and prejudice, see Wainwright v.
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a court may not reach the merits of: (a) suc-
cessive claims which raise grounds identical to grounds heard and decided
on the merits of a previous petition, Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 431
(1986); (b) new claims, not previously raised which constitutes an abuse
of the writ, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 487; or (c) procedurally defaulted
claims in which the petitioner failed to follow applicable state procedural
rules in raising the claims. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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on death row-when challenged that the petition abuses the
writ, must show either a miscarriage of justice or actual inno-
cence. 3 Rose v. Lundy2  puts a prisoner in a bind with this
doctrine. In the ordinary case the prisoner must either tempo-
rarily drop the federal case and accept the delay, and potential-
ly additional incarceration, if the claim proves ultimately to be
meritorious. Alternatively, she must abandon the unexhausted
claim and risk losing it as an abuse of the writ upon later
resurrection.
Some state court judges remain unsympathetic with the en-
tire post-conviction process; some such judges set execution
dates and then refuse to stay the execution pending investiga-
tion and orderly post-conviction litigation. In this situation, a
federal habeas corpus petition may be filed seeking a stay of
execution. Even in more hospitable jurisdictions a death row
inmate's lawyer may discover a potentially meritorious claim
late in the process when stays are harder to procure. Returning
to state court to exhaust a claim risks loss of the stay. 5 A
Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 2518 (1992).
253. McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494. Actual innocence in a death penalty case includes
the curious concept referred to as "innocence of the death penalty." A prisoner may
be guilty of murder without being guilty of capital murder. Under Sawyer v. Whitley,
112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992), a showing of the absence of one or more of the elements
which made the prisoner death eligible constitutes a showing of actual innocence of
the death penalty. Id. at 2523. A showing of actual innocence requires a showing "by
clear and convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror
would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty under the applicable
state law." Id. at 2525 (Blackmun. J., concurring). There may be a distinction be-
tween "abuse of the writ" situations and "successive petition" cases. It is not clear
whether the miscarriage or ends of justice prong of a showing of 'cause' is limited in
abuse of the writ situations to a showing of actual innocence. Successive petitions
(which involve renewal of previously rejected claims as opposed to new claims on a
successor habeas petition) are limited to a showing of actual innocence-the ends of
justice exception collapses entirely into the innocence prong. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505
U.S. 333 (1992); Kuhmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) (plurality opinion). Profes-
sor Robbins notes that "[a]lthough the plurality in Kuhlmann v. Wilson intended for
the ends-of-justice test to apply only to successive-petitions cases, some lower federal
courts have used the test to determine whether the petitioner has abused the writ."
ROBBINS, supra note 236, § 16.03 at 16-11 (citations omitted).
254. 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
255. See, e.g., ROBBINS, supra note 236, at 11-7. Professor Liebman, supra note 212
§ 4.3, at 35, points out that "[t]he petitioner then may ask the federal court to stay
the execution and to defer adjudicating the federal petition pending completion of the
unexhausted proceedings...." The granting of a stay in this instance is discretionary
and not all federal judges are inclined to grant stays. See, e.g., LIEBMAN, supra note
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death row inmate may have to abandon a potentially meritori-
ous claim in order to remain in federal court.
F. Conclusion
The exhaustion doctrine began as a discretionary concept
predicated upon comity. The rules have increasingly become
more rigid until they have in some ways come to mimic juris-
dictional concepts.256 These rules can operate with peculiar
harshness in capital cases. A lawyer handling a federal habeas
corpus petition cannot ignore the exhaustion doctrine, she must
keep it firmly in mind in drafting the petition and any amend-
ments thereto, and she must be prepared at all stages to meet
the objection that an issue has not been exhausted.
Part Two of this article will appear in a forthcoming issue of
the University of Richmond Law Review.
212, § 6.3. Certain judges in Texas and Louisiana have been notorious for their refus-
al to grant death row inmates stays in any circumstances. The problem is, apparent-
ly, a continuing one. Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485 (3d Cir. 1994), illustrates the
point. This death row habeas petition was dismissed on March 28, 1993 by the dis-
trict court "as a mixed petition which contained both exhausted and unexhausted
claims." Id. at 1488. On July 30, 1993 the Delaware Superior Court dismissed all but
one of the unexhausted claims as procedurally barred and set an execution date of
August 19, 1993. Id. at 1489. On August 11, before the state court had yet acted on
the one unexhausted and undefaulted claim, the petitioner abandoned his one
unexhausted claim in federal court and elected to proceed without it (petitioner was
no doubt motivated at this point to try to secure a stay from any possible source).
Id. at 1488. The district court denied all of petitioner's motions and summarily de-
nied habeas relief. Id. Only on August 18, one day before the execution date, did the
court of appeals grant a stay so that the court could consider the case. Id. at 1489.
Neither the state judges nor the federal district judge would enter a stay, and unless
both the court and counsel'were extraordinarily efficient, there appears to have been
little time for consideration of petitioner's claims. Id.
256. Yackle, supra note 221 passim.
